{"title":"On the Other Side of Hedge Fund Equity Trades","authors":"Xinyu Cui, O. Kolokolova, J. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304606","url":null,"abstract":"Hedge funds earn positive ex post abnormal returns and avoid negative abnormal returns on their equity portfolios when trading in the opposite direction of highly diversified low-turnover institutional investors (quasi indexers). This pattern seems to be driven by the preferences of quasi indexers for high-market-beta stocks together with the ability of hedge funds to identify subsets of especially profitable trades. It remains pronounced when accounting for other determinants of hedge fund trades, such as stock liquidity, market anomalies, and major corporate events. Trading against other institutional investors or noninstitutions does not result in abnormal performance for hedge funds. This paper was accepted by David Sraer, finance. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4877 .","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":" 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113947760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockholders Diversity: Effect of Polyphony on the Power of Monitoring","authors":"E. Volkova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3047469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3047469","url":null,"abstract":"Majority of U.S. companies have multiple blockholders which could differ in their characteristics and skills even within one company. Diversity among blockholders within a given firm arguably has a positive and synergistic impact on the firm's value. Alternatively, conflicting objectives and interests may cause diversity to adversely impact company operations. To investigate the impact of blockholder diversity on company value, I construct diversity measures reflecting blockholder heterogeneity in the categories of identity, portfolio size, and investment horizon. To identify the causality channel, I use shocks from blockholder acquisitions of financial firms, as well as unexpected increases in payouts they receive from other positions: I consequently find that block diversity has a significant negative influence on company value and operations. Additional tests indicate a potential explanation for this negative effect of diversity in a lack of agreement among the blockholders regarding the firm’s future direction.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124946125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael W. Brandt, Federico Nucera, Giorgio Valente
{"title":"Can Hedge Funds Time the Market?","authors":"Michael W. Brandt, Federico Nucera, Giorgio Valente","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2988484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2988484","url":null,"abstract":"We answer the somewhat narrower question of whether hedge funds adjust their conditional market exposure in response to real‐time changes in macroeconomic conditions, and whether doing so improves their performance. We find that hedge funds differ substantially in their responsiveness to macroeconomic data. The most procyclical market timers outperform their less active and counter‐cyclical peers by over 4% annualized with a risk adjusted alpha of 5.5%.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131724457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Remaking of Wall Street","authors":"Andrew F. Tuch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3002822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3002822","url":null,"abstract":"This Article critically examines the transformation of the financial services industry during and since the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. This transformation has been marked by the demise of the major investment banks and the related rise of a set of powerful players known as private equity firms. First, this Article argues that private equity firms now mirror investment banks in their mix of activities; ethos of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and risk-taking; role as “shadow banks”; and overall power and influence. \u0000These similarities might suggest that private equity firms pose financial risks similar to those caused by their now-defunct predecessors. But this Article suggests that private equity firms, as currently structured, are more financially stable and pose less systemic risk to the global economy. These firms are structured and funded in ways that may address the basic shortcoming that led to investment banks’ downfall – specifically, the use of short-term debt to fund longer-duration assets. It thus argues that, in the face of onerous post-Crisis reforms, Wall Street has evolved to displace investment banks with more financially resilient institutions. Importantly, however, the Article cautions that ongoing changes in private equity firms’ broker-dealer activities raise systemic concerns that require active regulatory monitoring. The Article also identifies systemic and financial stability concerns arising from the funds that these firms manage, particularly their hedge and credit funds, about which little detailed information is publicly available. \u0000Finally, the Article explores other implications of these developments, including for the effectiveness of post-Crisis regulation, the popular backlash against Wall Street, the incidence of misconduct, and the evolution of financial institutions.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133981982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Art Investment Vehicles and the Challenges of the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD)","authors":"R. J. Willette, D. Eckner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2722743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2722743","url":null,"abstract":"As interest in art as an alternative asset class has grown in recent years so has the emergence of art investment vehicles. These vehicles seek to capitalize on the inherent inefficiencies of the art market and provide the potential to identify, create and execute transactions in works of art at highly attractive terms. Art fund managers seek to approach art investment in the same manner as any collective portfolio manager such as UCITSD management companies or AIFMs. Proven techniques and disciplines common to the management of every asset class are employed and modern portfolio theory, sophisticated risk management tools, and quantitative and qualitative analysis forms the basis for investment strategy and process. This paper briefly discusses challenges for art fund managers under the AIFMD.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"427 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115655023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Model for Dynamic Performance Fee Evaluation","authors":"Aram Gushchyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2529172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2529172","url":null,"abstract":"The most common method for calculating hedge fund performance fees for a strategy is the so called 2/20 rule when the performance fee rate is assumed to be fixed at 20% of the profit and mostly independent of the internal dynamics of the strategy’s returns.We would like to propose a new model where the performance fee rate will be adjusted depending on the dynamics of the strategy’s growth. As a key component of the model, we will introduce a new set of performance metrics that, in our opinion, is able to describe the behavior of the strategy in the most comprehensive way. We think that this approach favors both the investors and fund managers in that way that it is able to adjust the reward depending on how well the manager both tracks the market and creates an additional profit.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125273668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Tournament Behavior in Hedge Funds: High Water Marks, Managerial Horizon, and the Backfilling Bias","authors":"G. Aragon, Vikram Nanda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1361846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361846","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the risk choices by hedge funds that perform poorly, relative to other funds and in absolute terms - and test predictions on the extent to which these decisions are related to the fund's incentive contract, investment horizon and dissemination of performance information. We find that tournament behavior is more prevalent in the (backfilled) period when funds may be at an incubation stage, before they start voluntarily reporting to a database. Excluding backfilled data, we find that variance shifts depend on absolute rather than relative fund performance. Consistent with theoretical arguments, the propensity for losing funds to increase risk is significantly weaker among those that tie the manager's incentive pay to the fund's high-water mark - suggesting a possible benefit from such incentive structures - and among funds that face little immediate risk of closure. Overall, the combination of factors such as reporting performance to a database, high-water mark provisions, and low risk of fund closure appear to make poorly performing funds more conservative with regard to risk-shifting.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124708184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recommendations for Reality-Based Regulatory Reform for Hedge Funds and Other Private Pools of Capital","authors":"J. Taub","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1543862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1543862","url":null,"abstract":"The author contends that current legislative proposals that would require hedge fund managers to register as Investment Advisers with the SEC are necessary but insufficient. In order to protect investors and reduce systemic risk, hedge fund operations and investment strategies should be subject to many of the substantive requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the law governing mutual funds. These requirements might include leverage restrictions, asset valuation controls, limitations on self-dealing and related party transaction and fiduciary duties to fund investors. The justification for continued exemption from comprehensive regulation is based upon false premises, including the myth that only “sophisticated investors” have capital at risk through hedge funds. Taub dispels these “myths” and recommends reality-based regulatory reform.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124438320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Systematic Funds Outperform Discretionary Funds","authors":"Irene E. Aldridge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1516020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516020","url":null,"abstract":"This article compares the performance of systematic and discretionary hedge funds. In systematic funds, most trades are originated and executed by computer programs written for that purpose. In discretionary funds, human traders make decisions when to buy and sell which financial securities. The analysis herein shows that systematic funds consistently outperform discretionary funds when performance is measured by Jensen’s Alpha. Systematic funds also exhibit lower correlation with the S&P 500 index and produce higher cumulative returns since inception, although with higher volatility.On the basis of absolute monthly returns, systematic hedge funds outperform discretionary hedge funds whenever markets are falling. When markets are rising, however, discretionary funds tend to deliver higher absolute returns than do systematic funds. On the absolute return basis, the difference between systematic and nonsystematic funds cannot be explained by liquidity considerations: both systematic and discretionary funds deliver comparable returns in both liquid and illiquid markets.Across a variety of other metrics, however, systematic funds perform much better than discretionary funds in limited liquidity across a variety of metrics: systematic funds produce less extreme drawdowns, higher Sharpe ratios, higher Jensen’s alpha, and attract higher Assets Under Management (AUM).Finally, systematic funds exhibit lower skewness and kurtosis than do discretionary funds. When adjusted for skewness and kurtosis, systematic returns are statistically indistinguishable from discretionary returns, suggesting that much of systematic funds’ outperformance comes from better ability to manage extreme events, performing better than discretionary funds in crisis conditions.","PeriodicalId":428255,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Hedge Funds & Alternative Investment Firms (Topic)","volume":"293 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132827570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}