The Logic in Philosophy of Science最新文献

Syntactic Metalogic 语法元逻辑

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.006

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Semantic Metalogic 语义元逻辑

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.008

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Syntactic Metalogic Redux 语法元逻辑Redux

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.007

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The Category of Propositional Theories 命题理论范畴

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.005

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Semantic Metalogic Redux 语义元逻辑Redux

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.009

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Invitation to Metatheory 元理论的邀请

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.003

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Index 指数

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.012

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From Metatheory to Philosophy 从元理论到哲学

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.010

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The Category of Sets 集合的范畴

The Logic in Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/9781316275603.004

Hans Halvorson

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引用次数: 1