Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10最新文献

Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk 道德义务与认知风险

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10 Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.003.0005

Z. J. King, B. Babic

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引用次数: 9

A Kantian Solution to the Trolley Problem 电车问题的康德式解

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10 Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.003.0010

P. Kleingeld

引用次数: 6

Willful Ignorance and Moral Responsibility 故意无知和道德责任

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10 Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.003.0004

M. J. Zimmerman

引用次数: 2

Incomparable Numbers 无与伦比的数字

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10 Pub Date : 2020-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.003.0006

Kenneth Walden

引用次数: 0

Equal Respect for Rational Agency 平等尊重理性能动性

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10 Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.003.0009

M. Cholbi

引用次数: 1