Fox: Accounting (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Revenue Recognition: A Brave New World","authors":"Elizabeth A. Gordon, E. Henry, Hsiao-Tang Hsu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088041","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the market reaction to the discussions and deliberations during the period 1998 to 2015 surrounding the new revenue recognition standard issued simultaneously by the FASB and IASB. We find that market reactions to events leading to the joint standard differ for US GAAP and IFRS firms. The reaction is a net negative reaction for US GAAP reporters but a net positive reaction for IFRS reporters. US GAAP (IFRS) firms in high litigation industries experience negative (less positive) market reactions to those in low risk industries. In certain high-impact industries in the U.S. including medical equipment and telecommunications, the market reaction is positive suggesting benefits in these industries. Further, the results for the most visible and significant events are consistent with those based on the full set of events. The evidence suggests that the new revenue recognition standard imposes net costs to the U.S. firms, except in those industries expected to benefit the most, while it provides net benefits to IFRS reporters.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133349950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts: Implications for Analyst Forecast Timing and Market Efficiency","authors":"R. Banker, Joshua A. Khavis, Han-Up Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3057388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057388","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how the arrival of Estimize, a provider of crowdsourced earnings forecasts, impacts IBES analysts’ forecast timeliness and facilitates market efficiency. We find that IBES analysts become more responsive to earnings announcements and start issuing their quarterly forecasts earlier when faced with competition from Estimize. The Estimize effect is strongest when Estimize quarterly forecasts pose a direct competitive threat to IBES — when Estimize forecasts are present within 3 days of earnings announcements (i.e., are issued early). Specifically, IBES analysts become more responsive to earnings announcements post Estimize, and issue more than 9% of their one-quarter-ahead forecasts earlier in the quarter when early Estimize coverage is present in the prior quarter. We also document that this increased responsiveness of IBES analysts facilitates market efficiency as it results in greater immediate market reaction to earnings surprises and mostly eliminates the post-earnings-announcement drift.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130846775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Confounding Effect of Cost Stickiness on Conservatism Estimates","authors":"R. Banker, Sudipta Basu, Dmitri Byzalov, Janice Y. S. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2130897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2130897","url":null,"abstract":"Sales decreases affect earnings more than sales increases because of cost stickiness. We hypothesize that this correlated omitted variable constitutes a confounding effect in standard asymmetric timeliness models. Controlling for a piecewise linear effect of sales changes in these models decreases the measured asymmetric timeliness significantly and changes inferences about the average level of conservatism and the extent of cross-sectional variation in conservatism. Validation tests confirm that the asymmetry for sales changes is consistent with sticky costs and is distinct from conditional conservatism. Future empirical research on conditional conservatism should recognize the potential confounding effect of sticky costs.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114656516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymmetries in Cost-Volume-Profit Relation: Cost Stickiness and Conditional Conservatism","authors":"R. Banker, Sudipta Basu, Dmitri Byzalov, Janice Y. S. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312179","url":null,"abstract":"Cost-volume-profit (CVP) analysis is based on a linear model of earnings behavior. However, recent research documents two potential sources of asymmetry in earnings: cost stickiness and conditional conservatism. We examine the implications of these asymmetries for CVP analysis and develop an “asymmetric CVP” (ACVP) framework incorporating both phenomena. ACVP estimates for Compustat/CRSP data reveal dramatic deviations from the standard CVP model (attributed to both stickiness and conservatism). These asymmetric deviations lead to major conceptual revisions in CVP analysis and have a large impact on various CVP benchmarks.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124461452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CIO Reporting Structure, Strategic Positioning, and Firm Performance","authors":"R. Banker, Nan Hu, P. Pavlou, Jerry N. Luftman","doi":"10.2307/23044053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/23044053","url":null,"abstract":"Almost 30 years after the introduction of the CIO position, the ideal CIO reporting structure (whether the CIO should report to the CEO or the CFO) is yet to be identified. There is an intuitive assumption among some proponents of IT that the CIO should always report to the CEO to promote the importance of IT and the CIO's clout in the firm, while some adversaries of IT call for a CIO-CFO reporting structure to keep a tab on IT spending. However, we challenge these two ad hoc prescriptions by arguing that neither CIO reporting structure is necessarily optimal, and that the CIO reporting structure should not be used to gauge the strategic role of IT in the firm. \u0000 \u0000First, extending the strategy-structure paradigm, we propose that a firm's strategic positioning (differentiation or cost leadership) should be a primary determinant of its CIO reporting structure. We hypothesize that differentiators are more likely to have their CIO report to the CEO in order to pursue IT initiatives that help the firm's differentiation strategy. We also hypothesize that cost leaders are more likely to have their CIO report to the CFO to lead IT initiatives to facilitate the firm's cost leadership strategy. Second, extending the alignment if it view, we propose that firms that align their CIO reporting structure with their strategic positioning (specifically, differentiation with a CIO-CEO reporting structure and cost leadership with a CIO-CFO reporting structure) will have superior future performance. \u0000 \u0000Longitudinal data from two periods (1990-1993 and 2006) support the proposed hypotheses, validating the relationship between a firm's strategic positioning and its CIO reporting structure, and also the positive impact of their alignment on firm performance. These results challenge the ad hoc prescriptions about the CIO reporting structure, demonstrating that a CIO-CEO reporting structure is only superior for differentiators and a CIO-CFO reporting structure is superior only for cost leaders. The CIO reporting structure must, therefore, be designed to align with the firm's strategic positioning, independent of whether IT plays a key strategic role in the firm.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116851921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Insider Trading and Incentives to Manage Earnings","authors":"M. Beneish, Eric Press, Mark E. Vargus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.495862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.495862","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates two hypotheses about the relation between insider selling and earnings management in periods preceding poor corporate performance. Consistent with our litigation avoidance hypothesis, we provide evidence that managers manage earnings upwards after they have engaged in abnormally high levels of insider selling. In contrast, we find no support for the pump and dump hypothesis of earnings being managed before managers sell their equity. Our findings indicate insider trading provides managers with incentives to subsequently manage earnings upward, to distance their selling from the revelation of bad news and reduce the likelihood of reputation, employment, and litigation losses. We show these incentives co-exist and complement incentives to avoid default in a sample of 462 firms that experience technical default in 1983-1997. Our findings suggest that investors and those with oversight authority (e.g., boards of directors, auditors, and regulators) consider monitoring prior rather than contemporaneous insider-trading activity as a part of their corporate governance practices.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123909120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Relation between Incentives to Avoid Debt Covenant Default and Insider Trading","authors":"M. Beneish, Eric Press, Mark E. Vargus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.268548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.268548","url":null,"abstract":"We use a sample of firms that experience technical default to investigate whether an observable managerial action, managers? trading, is useful in (1) determining the existence of pre-default earnings management, and (2) in assessing whether specific contract modifications in renegotiated debt agreements are costly. We find income-increasing accruals and unexpected accruals in the year preceding the year of default of magnitudes sufficient to forestall default. We show, however, that the significant income-increasing accruals and unexpected accruals occur only in firms in which managers engage in abnormal insider selling. Our evidence suggests that by managing earnings to delay the onset of default, managers sell their equity-contingent wealth at higher prices. Finally, our evidence implies that renegotiated debt provisions?such as additional covenants and restricted borrowing?are costly for firms with greater investment opportunities prior to default.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131428498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adaptive Expectations, Time-Series Models, and Analyst Forecast Revision","authors":"L. Brown, Michael S. Rozeff","doi":"10.2307/2490508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2490508","url":null,"abstract":"The process by which analysts revise quarterly earnings forecasts is analyzed and compared to the way in which several time-series models of quarterly earnings revise forecasts. A significant portion of the analyst's forecast revision is explained by the most recent one-quarter-ahead forecast error. Analyst revisions are adaptive in the same manner that single-period ahead model forecasts are adaptive. At longer horizons, the evidence is that analysts revise forecasts in the same way that autoregressive models of quarterly earnings revise and not as moving average models do.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114466043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analyst Forecasting Errors and Their Implications for Security Analysis","authors":"L. Brown","doi":"10.2469/FAJ.V52.N1.1965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2469/FAJ.V52.N1.1965","url":null,"abstract":"Dreman and Berry (1995) have offered a perspective on analyst earnings forecast errors and their implications for security analysis. Among other arguments, they contend that the errors are too large to be reliably used by investors, the forecasts are less accurate than forecasts by time-series models, the errors are increasing over time, the analysts' forecasts are too optimistic, and the investment community relies too heavily on analyst forecasts. An alternative perspective on these issues is offered. The argument is that analysts' forecast errors are within 3% of an appropriate benchmark (namely, stock price), that their forecasts generally are significantly more accurate than forecasts by naive or sophisticated time-series models, that analyst forecast errors have not been increasing over time, that analysts have been too pessimistic in recent years, and that the investment community, by placing too much weight on forecasts made by time-series models, relies too little on analysts' forecasts.","PeriodicalId":423722,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Accounting (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127427341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}