2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)最新文献

Advances and challenges of quantitative verification and synthesis for cyber-physical systems 信息物理系统定量验证与综合的进展与挑战

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579999

Marta Z. Kwiatkowska

引用次数: 4

Towards foundational verification of cyber-physical systems 迈向网络物理系统的基础验证

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580000

G. Malecha, Daniel Ricketts, Mario M. Alvarez, Sorin Lerner

引用次数: 15

From control system security indices to attack identifiability 从控制系统安全指标到攻击可识别性

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580001

H. Sandberg, André M. H. Teixeira

引用次数: 21

Security games on infrastructure networks 基础设施网络上的安全游戏

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997

Saurabh Amin

{"title":"Security games on infrastructure networks","authors":"Saurabh Amin","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of robust control models the controller-disturbance interaction as a game where disturbance is nonstrategic. The proviso of a deliberately malicious (strategic) attacker should be considered to increase the robustness of infrastructure systems. This has become especially important since many IT systems supporting critical functionalities are vulnerable to exploits by attackers. While the usefulness of game theory methods for modeling cyber-security is well established in the literature, new game theoretic models of cyber-physical security are needed for deriving useful insights on \"optimal\" attack plans and defender responses, both in terms of allocation of resources and operational strategies of these players. This whitepaper presents some progress and challenges in using game-theoretic models for security of infrastructure networks. Main insights from the following models are presented: (i) Network security game on flow networks under strategic edge disruptions; (ii) Interdiction problem on distribution networks under node disruptions; (iii) Inspection game to monitor commercial non-technical losses (e.g. energy diversion); and (iv) Interdependent security game of networked control systems under communication failures. These models can be used to analyze the attacker-defender interactions in a class of cyber-physical security scenarios.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127057021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Accountability in cyber-physical systems 网络物理系统中的责任

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998

Anupam Datta, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, Sean Weerakkody

{"title":"Accountability in cyber-physical systems","authors":"Anupam Datta, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, Sean Weerakkody","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998","url":null,"abstract":"Our position is that a key component of securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) is to develop a theory of accountability that encompasses both control and computing systems. We envision that a unified theory of accountability in CPS can be built on a foundation of causal information flow analysis. This theory will support design and analysis of mechanisms at various stages of the accountability regime: attack detection, responsibility-assignment (e.g., attack identification or localization), and corrective measures (e.g., via resilient control) As an initial step in this direction, we summarize our results on attack detection in control systems. We use the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal information flow measure. We then recover, using information flow analyses, a set of existing results in the literature that were previously proved using different techniques. These results cover passive detection, stealthy attack characterization, and active detection. This research direction is related to recent work on accountability in computational systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. We envision that by casting accountability theories in computing and control systems in terms of causal information flow, we can provide a common foundation to develop a theory for CPS that compose elements from both domains.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123416860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

A set-theoretic approach for secure and resilient control of Cyber-Physical Systems subject to false data injection attacks 针对虚假数据注入攻击的网络物理系统安全弹性控制的集合理论方法

2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS) Pub Date : 2016-04-11 DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580002

Walter Lucia, B. Sinopoli, G. Franzé

引用次数: 30