{"title":"The Unity of the Rational Mind","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that inference is a self-conscious act. The account appeals to the ‘being-in-mind-together’ of beliefs. Beliefs that are in mind together are subject to rationally grounded metaphysical necessity. Because one believes p, one can’t or must believe q. But what ultimately explains this sort of necessity? If it is impossible to hold a pair of mental states in mind at once and the impossibility has its source in our understanding of the necessary falsehood of a conjunction, then the subject has knowledge not just of the individual states they’re in but also of their combination. What, then, is the relation between the unity of our beliefs and consciousness of this unity? My answer: the unity of the rational mind consists in the subject’s consciousness of that unity.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131520376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Challenge for an Account of Inference","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The Taking Condition looms large in recent discussions of inference: in inferring q from p, one draws the conclusion in light of one’s representing p as supporting q. This condition highlights two elements of inference. First, a causal element: via the inference, the subject arrives at a belief. Second, this arrival transpires in virtue of the subject’s endorsing the thought: p supports q. Inference thus joins two elements: one causal, the other evaluative. I show in this chapter that extant accounts fail to properly join these two elements. They fail because the two elements are not, as is generally assumed, separable. Inference is the endorsement of a thought that the ground supports the grounded and this endorsement amounts to a causal connection between the corresponding beliefs. The difficulty is in seeing how a thought could not merely register the presence of, but actually constitute the causal relation between beliefs.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133404866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Self-Consciousness of Belief","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that to believe that p is to know that you believe that p and to know it simply by believing it. The following three premises entail the inseparability of belief from knowledge of belief: (i) S believes that p only if S is able to honestly assert that p; (ii) S is able to honestly assert that p only if S is able to avow the belief that p; and (iii) S is able to avow the belief that p only if S knows that she believes that p. I defend each premise from objections, paying special attention to the phenomenon of self-deception. I show that one can hold both that belief is essentially self-conscious and that people are sometimes wrong about what they believe. Ultimately, I use the theory of belief developed in chapter one to account for doxastic self-consciousness.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129211818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Nonsense of Moore’s Paradox","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"I show how the view on offer resolves Moore’s Paradox. Moorean absurdity does not, as it is generally held, involve an inter-level conflict between first- and second-order beliefs (or the corresponding utterances); it is just a conflict between doxastic stances on the question of a single proposition’s truth. Moore-Paradoxical statements are, in this way, similar to statements of the form “p and not-p.” What makes Moorean absurdity puzzlingly puzzling is that whereas an utterance of “p” expresses the speaker’s stance on the truth of p, the corresponding utterance of “I believe that p” would seem to express the speaker’s stance on the logically unrelated proposition that she believes that p. But this is a mistake. The correct explanation of Moorean absurdity is that both assertion and explicit belief-avowal manifest precisely the same thing: self-conscious knowledge of (first-order) belief.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132465090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Belief and Judgment","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"I develop an account of belief by way of discussing the following five interrelated truths: (i) to believe that p is to represent p as true; (ii) truth is a standard by which beliefs are assessed; (iii) a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ has application to beliefs; (iv) beliefs are governed by the law of non-contradiction; and (v) a belief is the sort of thing one can bring to mind. To believe, I argue, is to represent a proposition as what one should represent as true. Paradigmatic beliefs (which I call judgments) are governed metaphysically, and not just normatively, by the law of non-contradiction. One cannot clearly and distinctly at once represent as true both a proposition and its contrary. I respond to a variety of objections to this position, including—at length—the objection that the account is undermined by the beliefs of non-human animals and human infants.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114820761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inference without Regress","authors":"E. Marcus","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"A central obstacle for an account of inference is to show how it is possible to satisfy the Taking Condition without engendering a vicious regress. This is the lesson of Carroll’s Paradox. The basic difficulty is this: whatever knowledge one employs in judging that the premises support the conclusion would seem itself to be part of what supports the conclusion, thus requiring a further piece of knowledge. I argue that inferring is a matter of understanding the relevant propositions well enough to recognize that it is impossible for premises that one accepts to be true and the conclusion to be false, so that one sees the conclusion as what must be true, thereby believing it. Nothing more is required for inference than the proper understanding of premises and conclusion.","PeriodicalId":420137,"journal":{"name":"Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121110153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}