Jed J. Neilson, Stephen G. Ryan, K. P. Wang, Biqin Xie
{"title":"Asset-Level Transparency and the (E)Valuation of Asset-Backed Securities","authors":"Jed J. Neilson, Stephen G. Ryan, K. P. Wang, Biqin Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3247342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3247342","url":null,"abstract":"Effective as of November 23, 2016, SEC Regulation (“Reg”) AB II requires issuers of certain types of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) to disclose information about the credit-risk attributes of each asset in the underlying pool. The prior Reg AB required issuers to disclose only pool-level summary statistics for individual credit-risk attributes. We examine how ABS issuers’ asset-level disclosures under Reg AB II affect the (e)valuation of ABS by investors and credit rating agencies. Using difference-in-differences models that compare affected and unaffected types of ABS, we find that asset-level disclosures lead to initial ABS yields and credit ratings that better predict the subsequent performance of the underlying assets, consistent with these disclosures improving yield informativeness and credit rating quality. These results are concentrated in deals with above-median risk layering in the underlying assets, for which the disclosures previously provided under Reg AB were less informative, and in deals with above-median complexity in the tranching of credit risk. We further find that asset-level disclosures are associated with lower yields, consistent with transparency lowering ABS issuers’ cost of capital. Lastly, we provide direct evidence that most prospective ABS investors download asset-level information from EDGAR during the price formation period prior to ABS issuance.","PeriodicalId":419605,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Rules Set by Agencies & Regulators (Sub-Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134128641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment","authors":"W. Bratton, M. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1480290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1480290","url":null,"abstract":"Many look toward enactment of the law reform agenda held out by proponents of shareholder empowerment as a part of the regulatory response to the financial crisis. This Article argues that the financial crisis exposes major weaknesses in the shareholder case. Our claim is that shareholder empowerment delivers management a simple and emphatic marching order: manage to maximize the market price of the stock. And that is exactly what the managers of a critical set of financial firms did in recent years. They managed to a market that focused on increasing observable earnings and, as it turned out, failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk that went largely unobserved. The fact that management bears primary responsibility for the disastrous results does not suffice to effect a policy connection between increased shareholder power and sound regulatory reform. A policy connection instead turns on a counterfactual question: Whether increased shareholder power would have imported more effective risk management in advance of the crisis. We conclude that no plausible grounds exist for making such a case. In the years preceding the financial crisis, shareholders validated the strategies of the very financial firms that pursued high leverage, high return, and high risk strategies and penalized those that did not. It is hard to see how shareholders, having played a role in fomenting the crisis, have a positive role to play in its resolution.The prevailing legal model of the corporation strikes a better balance between the powers of directors and shareholders than does the shareholder-centered alternative. Shareholder proponents see management agency costs as a constant in history and shareholder empowerment as the only tool available to reduce them. This Article counters this picture, making reference to agency theory and recent history to describe a dynamic process of agency cost reduction. It goes on to show that shareholder empowerment would occasion significant agency costs on its own by forcing management to a market price set in most cases under asymmetric information and set in some cases in speculative markets in which heterogeneous expectations obscure the price’s informational content.","PeriodicalId":419605,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Rules Set by Agencies & Regulators (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122724363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors","authors":"D. Masciandaro, M. Quintyn, M. Nieto","doi":"10.5089/9781451872897.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451872897.001","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2009 a new financial supervisory framework for the European Union (EU) was endorsed, consisting of a macro- and a micro-prudential pillar. The latter is composed of a Steering Committee, a supranational layer and a network of national supervisory authorities at the bottom, de facto establishing a complex multiple principals-multiple agents network. This paper focuses on the network of national agencies. Starting from an analysis of supervisory architectures and governance arrangements, we assess to what extent lack of convergence could undermine efficient and effective supervision. The main conclusion is that harmonization of governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors' incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the quality of supervision.","PeriodicalId":419605,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Rules Set by Agencies & Regulators (Sub-Topic)","volume":"303 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122316770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}