DecisionSciRN: Pure & Mixed Strategy Games (Sub-Topic)最新文献

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A Contest Model With Reference-Dependent Preferences 具有参考依赖偏好的竞争模型

DecisionSciRN: Pure & Mixed Strategy Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3661857

Rubén Poblete-Cazenave

引用次数: 0

Game of Variable Contributions to the Common Good under Uncertainty 不确定性下共同利益的可变贡献博弈

DecisionSciRN: Pure & Mixed Strategy Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.1287/opre.2019.1879

H. D. Kwon

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引用次数: 13

Stopping with Congestion and Private Payoffs 停止拥堵和私人支付

DecisionSciRN: Pure & Mixed Strategy Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3168689

Caroline D. Thomas

引用次数: 6