{"title":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","authors":"","doi":"10.1145/3457340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123027098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Journey Through Android App Analysis: Solutions and Open Challenges","authors":"Jacques Klein","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458298","url":null,"abstract":"Users can today download a wide variety of apps ranging from simple toy games to sophisticated business-critical apps. They rely on these apps daily to perform diverse tasks, some of them related to sensitive information such as their finance or health. Ensuring high-quality, reliable, and secure apps is thus key. In the TruX research group of the interdisciplinary center for Security, Reliability, and Trust (SnT) of the University of Luxembourg, we are working for about 10 years to deliver practical techniques, tools, and other artifacts (such as repositories) making the analysis of Android apps possible. In this paper, we will briefly introduce our key contributions in both (1) Android app static analysis to detect security issues, and (2) Android Malware Detection with machine learning. We will conclude by listing several open challenges that we are currently facing towards improving the analysis and security of Android apps.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122942460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crafting Adversarial Email Content against Machine Learning Based Spam Email Detection","authors":"Chenran Wang, Danyi Zhang, Suye Huang, Xiangyang Li, Leah Ding","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458302","url":null,"abstract":"While machine learning based spam detectors have proven useful, spammers are learning to bypass the detectors by modifying their email content. Adversarial attacks on machine learning models have been observed in domains such as image classification. Applying such adversarial attack algorithms to craft spam emails to evade spam email detectors, however, has limitations. Such algorithms generate adversarial perturbations in the feature space. Different from image data, translating the adversarial perturbations from the feature space to text formats, as in emails, changes the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbations. It can reduce the attack success rate in the case of spam email detection. In this paper, we study the feasibility of adversarial attacks on machine learning based spam detectors and propose two novel text crafting methods leveraging adversarial perturbations generated by the adversarial example generation algorithms to improve the attack effectiveness. One method tries to approximate the feature values and the other adds special words to original emails. In experimentation, we use PGD as an example to demonstrate and compare the effectiveness of our attack methods on spam email detectors. We also examine the transferability of the proposed attack methods on different machine learning models.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123929202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Keynote Talks","authors":"Li Li","doi":"10.1145/3467999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3467999","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132277761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Verification Method of Key-Exchange Protocols With a Small Amount of Input Using Tamarin Prover","authors":"Misato Nakabayashi, Y. Okano","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458301","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an automatic verification method for cryptographic protocols. Our method can verify whether or not the key-exchange protocol satisfies main security properties, requiring only the protocol specification as its input. The specification consists of, for example, how session keys are computed and which party sends/receives which data to/from the communication channel. We materialize our method using the Tamarin prover, which is an automatic verification tool for cryptographic protocols. To show the validity of our method, we verify main security properties of several existing protocols and find that the results coincide with what are theoretically known in cryptography. Our method is effective, because the complexity of cryptographic protocols has significantly increased in recent years. To overcome the complexity, people have started using automatic verification tools to verify the security of cryptographic protocols, but existing tools have two problems. First, the user must be familiar with the details of cryptography in order to describe formally the security model as part of input. Second, the input code is complex and its creation is error-prone; protocol specification and security model must be written in a specific language together with protocol-dependent extra codes. These two problems are resolved by our method.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131276371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ludovic Claudepierre, Pierre-Yves Péneau, D. Hardy, Erven Rohou
{"title":"TRAITOR: A Low-Cost Evaluation Platform for Multifault Injection","authors":"Ludovic Claudepierre, Pierre-Yves Péneau, D. Hardy, Erven Rohou","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458303","url":null,"abstract":"Fault injection is a well-known method to physically attack embedded systems, microcontrollers in particular. It aims to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the hardware to induce malfunction in the software and eventually bypass software security or retrieve sensitive information. We propose a low-cost platform called TRAITOR inducing faults with clock glitches with the capacity to inject numerous and precise bursts of faults. From an evaluation point of view, this platform allows easier and cheaper investigations over complex attacks than costly EMI benches or laser probes.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125833736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Session 2: Security by Design","authors":"Li Li","doi":"10.1145/3468001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3468001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126924055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Systematic Hardening of Java's Information Hiding","authors":"Philipp Holzinger, E. Bodden","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458300","url":null,"abstract":"The Java runtime is installed on billions of devices worldwide, and over years it has been a primary attack vector for online criminals. In this work, we address that many attack vectors exploit weaknesses in Java's information hiding, making use of illegal access to private members of system classes. To study to what extent such attacks can be mitigated, and at what cost, this paper demonstrates a proof-of-concept solution to strengthen information hiding. Experiments show that this approach is backward compatible, and that it blocks 84% of all information-hiding attacks in a large-scale sample set at an average performance overhead below 2%. Based on our experiments, we suggest a solution to strengthen information hiding for productive use that has the potential to outperform our proof of concept in terms of robustness and performance, and also would block the remaining information-hiding attacks. Finally, we conclude with general advice on the design of secure software.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122922655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Session 1: Software Security","authors":"W. Meng","doi":"10.1145/3468000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3468000","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134052427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure Distributed Applications the Decent Way","authors":"Haofan Zheng, Owen Arden","doi":"10.1145/3457340.3458304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458304","url":null,"abstract":"Remote attestation (RA) authenticates code running in trusted execution environments (TEEs), allowing trusted code to be deployed even on untrusted hosts. However, trust relationships established by one component in a distributed application may impact the security of other components, making it difficult to reason about the security of the application as a whole. Furthermore, traditional RA approaches interact badly with modern web service design, which tends to employ small interacting microservices, short session lifetimes, and little or no state. This paper presents the Decent Application Platform, a framework for building secure decentralized applications. Decent applications authenticate and authorize distributed enclave components using a protocol based on self-attestation certificates, a reusable credential based on RA and verifiable by a third party. Components mutually authenticate each other not only based on their code, but also based on the other components they trust, ensuring that no transitively-connected components receive unauthorized information. While some other TEE frameworks support mutual authentication in some form, Decent is the only system that supports mutual authentication without requiring an additional trusted third party besides the trusted hardware's manufacturer. We have verified the secrecy and authenticity of Decent application data in ProVerif, and implemented two applications to evaluate Decent's expressiveness and performance: DecentRide, a ride-sharing service, and DecentHT, a distributed hash table. On the YCSB benchmark, we show that DecentHT achieves 7.5x higher throughput and 3.67x lower latency compared to a non-Decent implementation.","PeriodicalId":414339,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127323498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}