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DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)最新文献

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Optimally Imprecise Memory and Biased Forecasts 最佳不精确记忆和有偏差的预测
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI: 10.3386/w28075
Rava Azeredo da Silveira, Yeji Sung, M. Woodford
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引用次数: 20
Unemployment Duration under Flexible Information Acquisition 柔性信息获取下的失业持续时间
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3703236
Jeong Ho (John) Kim, Kyungmin Kim, Marilyn Pease
{"title":"Unemployment Duration under Flexible Information Acquisition","authors":"Jeong Ho (John) Kim, Kyungmin Kim, Marilyn Pease","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3703236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703236","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a worker's job search problem in which firms arrive sequentially, observe the worker's unemployment duration, and conduct an interview to learn about her unobservable productivity. Firms engage in fully flexible information acquisition subject to a uniformly posterior‐separable cost function. We provide a closed‐form characterization of equilibrium job search dynamics and demonstrate that endogenous information amplifies the “stigma” effect of long unemployment duration relative to exogenous information. We also show that lowering firms' information‐acquisition costs has ambiguous implications for a worker's unemployment duration.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved","PeriodicalId":411778,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126290551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Paying for Inattention 为注意力不集中买单
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3427147
A. Avoyan, G. Romagnoli
{"title":"Paying for Inattention","authors":"A. Avoyan, G. Romagnoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427147","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the discrete-choice rational inattention model to the case in which the decision maker can influence the payoff distribution across states. By reducing the gap between payoffs in different states, the decision maker is able to affect her own incentives to pay attention. The smaller the gap, the less attentive the decision maker needs to be. This new framework with endogenous incentives allows to derive a novel method for eliciting the attention level solely by observing the decision maker's incentive redistribution choice. As a result, we have two methods for observing the same variable of interest – targeted success probability: (i) through actual performance (method used in the literature); and (ii) through our model estimation, using incentive redistribution choices. Having two ways of identifying the targeted probability of success allows us to test rational inattention models without making any assumptions on the cost of attention function. Furthermore, the new framework allows us to identify and test the properties of the attention cost function.","PeriodicalId":411778,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128456487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent 竞相说服一个理性不专注的代理人
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3424451
Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer
{"title":"Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent","authors":"Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3424451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3424451","url":null,"abstract":"Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. For a large class of parameters, it is an equilibrium for the senders to provide the receiver's first best level of information - i.e. as much as she would learn if she herself controlled information provision. Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which nullifies the profitability of a unilateral provision of less information. Thus, we provide a novel channel through which competition with attention costs encourages information disclosure.","PeriodicalId":411778,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124431358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
On the Solution of the Variational Optimisation in the Rational Inattention Framework 理性不注意框架下变分优化问题的求解
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2018-02-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3128343
N. Hashimzade
{"title":"On the Solution of the Variational Optimisation in the Rational Inattention Framework","authors":"N. Hashimzade","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3128343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128343","url":null,"abstract":"I analyse the solution method for the variational optimisation problem in the rational inattention framework proposed by Christopher A. Sims. The solution, in general, does not exist, although it may exist in exceptional cases. I show that the solution does not exist for the quadratic and the logarithmic objective functions analysed by Sims (2003, 2006). For a linear-quadratic objective function a solution can be constructed under restrictions on all but one of its parameters. This approach is, therefore, unlikely to be applicable to a wider set of economic models.","PeriodicalId":411778,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114709837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mutual Fund Flows and Fund's Strategic Behavior When Investors Are Inattentive 投资者注意力不集中时的共同基金流动与基金策略行为
DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3505083
Apoorva Javadekar
{"title":"Mutual Fund Flows and Fund's Strategic Behavior When Investors Are Inattentive","authors":"Apoorva Javadekar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3505083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3505083","url":null,"abstract":"The R & P seminar held Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on September 04, 2017 by Dr. Apoorva Javadekar, Research Director, CAFRAL on Mutual Fund Flows and Fund's Strategic Behavior When Investors Are Inattentive","PeriodicalId":411778,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Rational Inattention Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124800040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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