{"title":"The Poverty of Philosophical Method","authors":"W. Lycan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Cartesian mind–body dualism is widely thought to have been simply refuted by sound argument. This chapter maintains that the case against dualism is very weak. There is no very good argument for materialism, and the objections to dualism are convincing only to materialists. In particular, the dreaded Interaction problem is not notably hard for a committed dualist to handle; and the other standard objections simply presuppose a third-person perspective that would not be tolerated by the dualist in the first place. Materialism is not significantly better supported than dualism. In the process, the chapter sets out a number of sociophilosophical observations that explain our impression that dualism has been simply shown to be untenable. The sociophilosophical observations, more generally, explain how an illusion is created to the effect that purely philosophical reasoning can either prove or refute a significant doctrine or claim.","PeriodicalId":409167,"journal":{"name":"On Evidence in Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132257663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Novel Refutation of Eliminative Materialism","authors":"W. Lycan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Moore’s method as developed in Chapter 1 is applied against the doctrine of Eliminative Materialism in the philosophy of mind. It resists all defenses of that view that are based on the “Theory” theory of mental discourse and the vulnerability of folk psychology. It also differs from all the standard objections to the doctrine. Two sophisticated replies are considered and rebutted: that there might be empirical linguistic evidence for an elimination-supporting entailment claim, and that my Moorean objection proves too much in that it makes an empirical proposition irrefutable. However, a possible halfway house is conceded: an everyday term sometimes divides its sense as between a scientifically naïve reading and a slightly neologized one compatible with a scientific account.","PeriodicalId":409167,"journal":{"name":"On Evidence in Philosophy","volume":"4 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133668878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Evidential Status of Intuitions","authors":"W. Lycan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829720.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829720.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"An intuition is an intellectual seeming, and this chapter argues that intuitions have evidential status. That claim is defended against objections: that an “intuition” is just a psychological fact about a person, that it merely reveals a lack of imagination, that it is already a tacit theory rather than a datum, that intuitions are malleable, and that they vary across communities. There is a further question of how intuitions might be shown to be reliable indicators of truth; this question is misguided, as it presupposes a competing epistemological theory that is rejected here. On the positive side, intuitions justify by way of what Goodman called reflective equilibrium. That method too has incurred objections, over and above those mentioned above, but they are deferred until Chapter 8.","PeriodicalId":409167,"journal":{"name":"On Evidence in Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125338583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Version of Moore’s Method","authors":"W. Lycan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at Moore’s distinctive method of refuting idealists and skeptics, and isolates and defends the most effective version of that method. The version is everywhere comparative and piecemeal: which is more credible, an abstract a priori philosophical premise, or the humdrum everyday proposition the idealist is concerned to attack? This version of the method is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore (that he is being dogmatic, that he begs the question, that he privileges “common sense” in an arbitrary way, etc.). An appendix considers but prescinds from the “Very Strong” position that, in principle, no idealist argument could possibly succeed against Moore.","PeriodicalId":409167,"journal":{"name":"On Evidence in Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122089128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intuitions and Coherentism","authors":"W. Lycan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829720.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The method of reflective equilibrium is a special case of explanatory-coherentist epistemology. This chapter defends explanatory coherentism against pertinent objections: Keith Lehrer’s problem regarding the data base; the charge of unacceptable conservatism; Stich’s threat of relativism; Goldman’s problem of wild and crazy beliefs; and Hacking’s doubt that explanatory virtues such as simplicity have anything to do with truth. The epistemological picture defended in this book does not incur the traditional problem of “getting from” one’s own sensory experiences to the external world, and so offers an unusual answer to the skeptic. But if one were to engage that problem, the explanatory coherentist has a viable approach.","PeriodicalId":409167,"journal":{"name":"On Evidence in Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123427210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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