SIRN: Financing System (Payroll Tax最新文献

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Optimal Insurance with Rank-Dependent Utility and Increasing Indemnities 具有等级依赖效用和增加赔偿的最优保险
SIRN: Financing System (Payroll Tax Pub Date : 2015-09-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2660113
Z. Xu, X. Zhou, S. Zhuang
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引用次数: 14
Renegotiating the Charitable Deduction 重新协商慈善扣除
SIRN: Financing System (Payroll Tax Pub Date : 2012-10-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2155994
Alexander Reid
{"title":"Renegotiating the Charitable Deduction","authors":"Alexander Reid","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2155994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2155994","url":null,"abstract":"The charitable contribution deduction is in peril, a potential casualty in the looming budget wars of 2013. All of the major tax reform proposals, from President Obama and Governor Romney to the Bowles-Simpson Deficit Commission, call for modifying, capping, or eliminating the charitable deduction to pay for tax cuts, spending or both. With its passing, charitable organizations will lose an important source of financial support, but we as Americans stand to lose much more than that. The charitable deduction protects our freedom to create, fund, and operate the institutions that make up American civil society with minimal interference from the government. It is a negotiated bargain between citizens and the state, establishing a delicate balance of power. Much as we might like to see balanced budgets and low tax rates in the short term, sacrificing the charitable deduction is not the best means of accomplishing these priorities. This paper argues that the appropriation of revenue by the federal government from the nonprofit sector by altering the charitable deduction entails a profound renegotiation of the relationship between the government and civil society, and it runs counter to the policy and spirit of American democracy.","PeriodicalId":408504,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Financing System (Payroll Tax","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127551167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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