Law & Evolution eJournal最新文献

Bringing Evolutionary Thinking into Economics and Finance: Advice for an Aspiring Economist 将进化思维引入经济学和金融学:给有抱负的经济学家的建议

Law & Evolution eJournal Pub Date : 2020-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3692892

D. Hirshleifer

引用次数: 1

Biological Institutions: The Political Science of Animal Cooperation 生物制度:动物合作的政治科学

Law & Evolution eJournal Pub Date : 2013-12-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2370952

Erol Akçay, J. Roughgarden, J. Fearon, J. Ferejohn, Barry R. Weingast

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引用次数: 10

Please Don't Use Science or Mathematics in Arguing for Human Rights or Natural Law 请不要用科学或数学来为人权或自然法辩护

Law & Evolution eJournal Pub Date : 2010-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2010.00457.x

A. Artosi

引用次数: 2

Evolutionary Theory and Behavioral Biology Research: Implications for Law 进化理论和行为生物学研究:对法律的启示

Law & Evolution eJournal Pub Date : 2010-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586073.003.0015

D. Herring

引用次数: 2

Evolutionary Psychology 进化心理学

Law & Evolution eJournal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_301606

Todd J. Zywicki

引用次数: 0