{"title":"A Constitutional Limitation","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines whether the constitutional clause that gives Congress power to legislate copyright and patent law (the Intellectual Property Clause) represents a limitation on Congress’s power. It interprets the constitutional purpose stated in the Clause—“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”—as barring Congress from extending protection to individual works that fail to fulfill that purpose. To support that interpretation, this chapter examines the constitutional policy underlying the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as the text and interpretive history of the Clause. It also responds to the argument that the Clause’s purpose should be construed as a non-limiting preamble and even if it is not, that the purpose should limit only the overall regime that Congress enacts—not individual works.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122465529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Works Involving Unlawful Conduct","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the exceptional situation in which a court should refuse to enforce rights to a patent or copyright—namely, where intellectual works involve unlawful activity. This chapter explains the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, which allows courts to refuse to enforce rights to such works. It recites the relevant case law that supports the application of this doctrine in the intellectual property context. It also argues that two specific situations should trigger this doctrine: namely, unlawful activity during the creative process and unlawful activity in the exercise of rights. Finally, this chapter proposes other factors that should be relevant in a court’s discretionary decision of whether to apply unclean hands in an intellectual property lawsuit.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114608002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tying It All Together","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the conclusions of each individual chapter. It presents the arguments in one coherent body, relating each chapter’s conclusions with the conclusions of the other chapters. It summarizes the moral limitations in the theory of intellectual property; the counterarguments against that conclusion; the presumption against judges making moral decisions; the exceptional equitable doctrine of unclean hands and the judicial history surrounding that doctrine in copyright and patent law; the constitutional obligation to deny protection for works that fall outside the meaning of the progress of science and useful arts; the moral discretion of Congress to deny protection; and the restraint on Congress’s discretion to deny protection that is imposed by free speech doctrines. It calls for courts, Congress, and executive agencies to uphold the moral values that underlie intellectual property law.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114354369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arguments against Denying Protection","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers theoretical objections. It responds to the following three arguments against denying intellectual property protection for reasons of morality: first, denying protection in many instances may actually increase the output of the undesired work; second, laws other than intellectual property can better address the moral problems at issue; and third, the government should not interfere with the laissez-faire market approach of letting the public decide the moral worth of an intellectual creation. This chapter contends that although each argument raises valid points, none implies that the law should extend protection to immoral intellectual creations. The chapter concludes that despite these arguments, specific conditions may warrant denial of protection.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117185118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial History on Unlawful Works","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the history of courts denying enforcement of rights or protection of subject matter for works involving unlawful conduct. On the copyright side, this chapter describes the relatively recent change in which courts have begun refusing to recognize the doctrine of unclean hands for works involving unlawful conduct. The chapter argues that the most influential case on this issue, Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, relies on flawed reasoning and a misapplication of law. On the patent side, this chapter observes that courts have uniformly rejected morality as a statutory standard for denying protection of specific subject matter. At the same time, courts preserved the unclean hands doctrine in the patent context, enabling denials based on certain sorts of wrongful conduct. The chapter concludes that courts should reject Mitchell in copyright law, yet uphold the present standard in patent law.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127744416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Limitations in IP Theory","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the three theories which underlie the system of intellectual property imply that specific moral values limit the scope of protectable subject matter. The economic theory, the labor-desert theory, and the autonomy-personality theory each impose certain moral limitations. Specifically, the economic theory implies that the law should not incentivize creations that result in a net harm to society; the labor-desert theory implies that the law should not reward creators whose intellectual works harm life, health, liberty, or property of another; and the autonomy-personality theory implies that the law should not recognize rights in works that inhibit another’s exercise of autonomy or personality. In examining these theories and their moral values, this chapter does not address specific issues of application.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125810535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Progress, Science, and useful Arts","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter interprets meanings of terms in the Intellectual Property Clause to conclude that Congress may not extend copyright or patent protection to certain types of intellectual creations. It argues that “Progress of . . . useful Arts” precludes patent protection for inventions that are so harmful to society that they are incapable of social advancement. It observes that this category of inventions would be relatively narrow. The chapter further argues that “Progress of Science” precludes copyright protection for two categories of works that fail to improve society’s knowledge—deceitful and pornographic expression. It concludes that as a constitutional matter, courts must deny protection for such works.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131110814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Free Speech","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers whether denying patent or copyright protection on moral grounds is inconsistent with doctrines of free speech. The chapter first examines whether moral denials of patent or copyright protection constitute a government restriction of private speech. For patent, it concludes that moral denials would not be such a restriction. The denial of patent protection likely reflects the government’s choice to selectively adopt private speech as its own, and even if not, the denials should be viewed as permissible regulations of conduct that only incidentally affect speech. By contrast, this chapter concludes that for copyright, moral denials of protection would restrict authors’ private speech. Consequently, the chapter further examines whether an exceptional doctrine in free speech law might excuse moral denials of copyright protection. The chapter posits that the limited-public-forum doctrine may excuse such denials, but only if the denial is viewpoint neutral, which imposes a severe speech restriction.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121126474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Problem of Judicial Moral Discretion","authors":"Ned Snow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues for a general presumption against judges or executive agencies relying on moral considerations to deny intellectual property rights. It recites the case law that well establishes this principle in both the contexts of copyright and patent. The chapter further argues, however, that courts or executive agencies should do so in the following exceptional situations: where Congress has enacted a constitutional statute that requires denial for a moral reason; where the Constitution mandates denial for a moral reason; and where an intellectual creation involves unlawful activity. The chapter explains why these circumstances merit an exception to the general presumption. It sets up the discussion for the ensuing chapters.","PeriodicalId":404174,"journal":{"name":"Intellectual Property and Immorality","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127171526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}