{"title":"A Colorful Mind","authors":"S. Chew, Wei Huang, Xun Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3851509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3851509","url":null,"abstract":"Color is ubiquitous. Our study appears to be the first to investigate the impact of color on decision making in a laboratory setting using a randomized control design. We find differences in the influence of red, yellow, green, and blue along with white primarily in social decision making rather than individual decision making. In the Andreoni-Miller dictator game, red and yellow subjects give less than green subjects when giving reduces the social pie. Red responders are more demanding than blue responders in the ultimatum game and red trustees reciprocate less than blue trustees in the trust game. Red and yellow subjects also cooperate less than green subjects in both the public goods game and the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. This study points to additional avenues to explore the use of colors in real-world environmental and business settings such as charitable donations, political campaigns, and business management.","PeriodicalId":403530,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Game Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133944924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evolution and Heterogeneity of Social Preferences","authors":"Charles Ayoubi, B. Thurm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3672390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672390","url":null,"abstract":"Why do individuals take different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stability to the case where individuals with distinct preferences coexist in a population. This approach allows us to establish the characteristics of an evolutionarily stable population. Then, introducing an assortment matrix for assortatively matched interactions, we prove the existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in 2×2 symmetric fitness games under constant assortment, and we identify the conditions for its existence. Conversely to the classical setting, we find that the favored preferences in a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population are context-dependent. As an illustration, we discuss when and how an evolutionarily stable population made of both selfish and moral individuals exists in a prisoner’s dilemma. These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed diversity of preferences among individuals.","PeriodicalId":403530,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Game Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129241493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Family of Alpha,[a,b] Stochastic Orders: Risk vs. Expected Value","authors":"Bar Light, Andres Perlroth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758275","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we provide a novel family of stochastic orders, which we call the $alpha,[a,b]$-concave stochastic orders, that generalizes second order stochastic dominance. \u0000These stochastic orders are generated by a novel set of \"very\" concave functions where $alpha$ parameterizes the degree of concavity. The $alpha,[a,b]$-concave stochastic orders allow us to derive novel comparative statics results for important applications in economics that could not be derived using previous stochastic orders. In particular, our comparative statics results are useful when an increase in the lottery's riskiness increases the agent's optimal action, but an increase in the lottery's expected value decreases the agent's optimal action. For this kind of situation, we provide a tool to determine which of these two forces dominates -- riskiness or expected value. We apply our results in consumption-savings problems, self-protection problems, and in a Bayesian game.","PeriodicalId":403530,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Game Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132495412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Exit With Information and Payoff Externalities","authors":"S. Boyarchenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3386351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3386351","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a stopping game between two players, where observations related to an unknown state of the nature arrive at random. Players not only learn from observing each other, but their payoffs also depend on the presence of the counterpart. I derive a general characterization of an equilibrium in this game. As applications, I consider two stopping time games which can be viewed as models of sponsored research - one is the model where researchers get funded until (if ever) a research project experiences the first failure, the other one is the model where researchers get rewarded if a success is achieved. In either case, the researchers start working on a project of unknown quality. The quality of the project is identified with its ability to generate failures or successes, in the first and second models, respectively. The rate of arrival of success conditioned on the quality of the project is an increasing function of the total time spent on the sponsored research. Observations of failures or successes are public information.I find subgame perfect equilibria in both models and show that in case of two competing researchers, neither equilibrium outcomes, nor cooperative solutions are efficient unless research creates no payoff externalities. In either model, at least one of the researchers experiments inefficiently long, so that a designer of a grant competition would like to stop sponsoring one of the players earlier than in equilibrium. Surprisingly, this result holds in the model where the first success is rewarded no matter whether the laggards are rewarded with a smaller prize or punished.","PeriodicalId":403530,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Other Game Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132739347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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