{"title":"State Institutions and Tax Capacity: An Empirical Investigation of Causality","authors":"O. A. Akanbi","doi":"10.5089/9781513509860.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513509860.001","url":null,"abstract":"Would better state institutions increase tax collection, or would higher tax collection help improve state institutions? In the absence of conclusive guidance from theory, this paper searches for an empirical answer to this question, using a panel dataset covering 110 non-resource-rich countries from 1996 to 2017. Employing a panel vector error correction model, the paper finds that tax capacity and state institutions cause and reinforce each other for a wide range of country groups. The bi-directional causality results suggest that developing tax capacity and building state institutions need to go hand in hand for best results, particularly in developing countries. Based on the impulse response analyses, the paper also finds that the causal effects in advanced economies are generally low in both directions, while in developing countries, both tax capacity and institutions shocks have larger positive impacts on institutions and tax capacity, respectively.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116060670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Herd Behavior in FDA Committees: A Structural Approach","authors":"Melissa Newham, Rune Midjord","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3208645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3208645","url":null,"abstract":"Many important decisions within public and private organizations are based on recommendations from expert committees and advisory boards. A notable example is the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's advisory committees, which make recommendations on new drug applications. Previously the voting procedure for these committees was sequential, however, due to concerns of herding and momentum effects the procedure was changed to simultaneous voting. Exploiting a novel dataset of more than ten thousand votes cast by experts in the FDA committees under both sequential and simultaneous voting, we estimate a structural model that allows us to measure the magnitude and importance of informational herding. We show that experts, voting on important scientific questions, are susceptible to herd behavior; on average 46% of the members take into consideration the sequence of previous votes when casting their vote, 17% of these voters actually herd i.e. change their vote from what they would have voted if ignoring the preceding votes.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115783558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abounding Opportunities","authors":"Michael D’Ascenzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3087652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087652","url":null,"abstract":"It has been almost two years since I've taken up the reins as Commissioner of Taxation and I'd like to share with you my journey so far. I trust that what I have learned from the ATO will resonate with you, because many of the challenges we face are similar. For example, how can we as the public service improve organisational effectiveness and efficiency? How do we best meet the challenges of a demanding and rapidly changing society? What values would hold true no matter what agency or department you walked into at this or any other time?","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126994846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Influence of the Quality of Government Institutions on Entrepreneurial Motivation: Exploring the Variance Across Countries.","authors":"José Ernesto Amorós, Pekka Stenholm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2538994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2538994","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasing understanding of the relationships between institutions and entrepreneurship, the influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurship is less addressed. This paper focuses on this critical eterminant of entrepreneurship in developing and developed ountries. Drawing from institutional theory we hypothesize and empirically assess the role of the quality of institutions in entrepreneurial activity. We examine how the quality of government institutions influences the rate of necessity-based entrepreneurial activity across countries and over time by using a cross-sectional time-series approach on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database covering the years 2001–2011. Our results suggest that higher economic development associated with better quality of institutions reduces the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurship. Our findings imply that developing countries must rationally organize their functions, and seek to remove unnecessary barriers, decrease political instability, and controls that hamper entrepreneurial activity.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116098613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Residual Insurance Market Mechanisms","authors":"Zac Hudson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1747296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747296","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the different regulatory mechanisms that states use to deal with individuals who cannot obtain automobile insurance in the competitive market. These regulatory schemes typically take one of four forms: (1) Assigned Risk Plans; (2) Joint Underwriting Associations; (3) State Sponsored Reinsurance Facilities; and (4) State Operated Funds. After outlining the importance of maximizing the availability of insurance, the mechanics, prevalence, and known effects of each of these systems is explored. Following the discussion of the operation of each of these residual market mechanisms, their effects on the population of the shared risk pool, the percentage of the population that is uninsured, and the average insurance expenditure in a given state are estimated using multivariate regression analysis. The results of this empirical inquiry are used to make suggestions about what specific policies should be implemented by states seeking to maximize insurance coverage in the competitive market at minimum costs.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115035669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Discontinuous Behavioral Responses to Recycling Laws and Plastic Water Bottle Deposits","authors":"W. Viscusi, Joel Huber, Jason Bell, C. Cecot","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHT005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHT005","url":null,"abstract":"Economic theory predicts that individual recycling behavior gravitates toward extremes--either diligent recycling or no recycling at all. Using a nationally representative sample of 3,158 bottled water users, this article finds that this prediction is borne out for consumer recycling of plastic water bottles. Both water bottle deposits and recycling laws foster recycling through a discontinuous effect that converts reluctant recyclers into diligent recyclers. Within this context, a number of factors influencing recycling emerge. The warm glow from being both an environmentalist and an environmental group member is about equal to the monetary value of 5 cent bottle deposits. Respondents from states with stringent recycling laws and bottle deposits have greater recycling rates. Consistent with recycling being a threshold response, the efficacy of these policy interventions is greater for those who do not already recycle, have lower income, and do not consider themselves to be environmentalists.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115112879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulation and Supervision of the Global Financial System - A Proposal for Institutional Reform","authors":"E. Denters","doi":"10.37974/ALF.76","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37974/ALF.76","url":null,"abstract":"International financial markets are supervised primarily by national authorities. However, national authorities are inherently incapable to regulate and supervise seamless globalised financial markets. To the extent international regulators exist, they constitute a disorderly patchwork of institutions. A proposal is made to create a system of regulators and supervisors under the umbrella of the World Financial Organisation. The WFO would encompass existing institutions and enhances international supervision through mandatory co-operation. The WFO streamlines supervisory activities, prevents overlap and lacunae, creates hierarchy and allocates responsibilities. The WFO would exercise its authority both over states and non-state actors, i.e. financial markets.","PeriodicalId":401005,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Agencies & States (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133649931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}