Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet最新文献

Exploring Simple Detection Techniques for DNS-over-HTTPS Tunnels 探索DNS-over-HTTPS隧道的简单检测技术

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474563

Carmen Kwan, P. Janiszewski, Shela Qiu, Cathy Wang, Cecylia Bocovich

{"title":"Exploring Simple Detection Techniques for DNS-over-HTTPS Tunnels","authors":"Carmen Kwan, P. Janiszewski, Shela Qiu, Cathy Wang, Cecylia Bocovich","doi":"10.1145/3473604.3474563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3473604.3474563","url":null,"abstract":"While DNS tunneling has shown promise as a censorship circumvention technique, it is limited by the plaintext nature of the DNS protocol, which renders it easily detectable to censors. DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [16] resolves this detectability obstacle, by encrypting the entire DNS protocol inside HTTPS. DoH tunneling shows promise as a medium for circumvention as its adoption increases in everyday usage, but it may still be vulnerable to flow-based attacks. This paper explores the design space of threshold-based attacks and defences on encrypted DNS tunnels. We identify thresholds separating tunnel traffic from browser-generated DoH traffic using packet size, packet rate, and throughput. We further propose modifications for encrypted DNS tunnels to evade flow-based detection and measure the reduction in usability. Notably, throughput is decreased by at least 27x and page load time is increased by at least 23x. However, despite the cutback in usability, we outline the potential for DNS tunnels to work in conjunction with, and obfuscate the registration traffic of, other anti-censorship tools.","PeriodicalId":400223,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116745206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Measuring QQMail's automated email censorship in China 衡量QQMail在中国的自动邮件审查

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474560

Jeffrey Knockel, Lotus Ruan

{"title":"Measuring QQMail's automated email censorship in China","authors":"Jeffrey Knockel, Lotus Ruan","doi":"10.1145/3473604.3474560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3473604.3474560","url":null,"abstract":"Desiring to control political ideas shared within its borders, China fosters its own domestic Internet communications platforms where it can better enforce its laws and more tightly control political expression. Access to foreign platforms failing to comply with China's requirements on speech restrictions are often wholesale blocked by the country's national firewall. However, some technologies, such as the Web and email, are too universal to wholesale block and are restricted discriminately. While China's restrictions to Web access have been extensively studied, our work provides a look into email censorship in China. In this work, we study censorship on Tencent's QQMail, the most popular email platform in China. We introduce a technique to test whether QQMail automatically censors a message, without requiring control of any Internet endpoints in China or any accounts on the QQMail platform, finding 173 combinations of keywords that trigger automated censorship of multiple political topics. We also discover that some censored keyword combinations have extenuating keyword combinations, any of whose presence disables the corresponding censored combination's censorship. Many of these extenuating terms are as politically sensitive as the censored combinations they are extenuating. We find that the motivation behind such extenuating terms is puzzling, defying easy explanation.","PeriodicalId":400223,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134436160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

BlindTLS: Circumventing TLS-based HTTPS censorship 盲tls:绕过基于tls的HTTPS审查

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474564

Sambhav Satija, Rahul Chatterjee

引用次数: 7

On the state of V3 onion services 关于V3洋葱服务的状态

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-27 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474565

Tobias Hoeller, Michael Roland, R. Mayrhofer

引用次数: 9

Interactions with Potential Mis/Disinformation URLs Among U.S. Users on Facebook, 2017-2019 2017-2019年Facebook上美国用户与潜在错误/虚假url的互动

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-23 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474561

Aydan Bailey, Theo Gregersen, Franziska Roesner

引用次数: 4

Even Censors Have a Backup: Examining China's Double HTTPS Censorship Middleboxes 即使审查者也有备份:检查中国的双重HTTPS审查中间人

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-23 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474559

Kevin Bock, Gabriel Naval, Kyle Reese, Dave Levin

引用次数: 9

A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar 缅甸互联网审查的多重视角

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet Pub Date : 2021-08-23 DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474562

Ramakrishna Padmanabhan, Arturo Filastò, Marianna Xynou, R. Raman, Kennedy Middleton, Mingwei Zhang, Doug Madory, Molly Roberts, A. Dainotti

引用次数: 14