Huandong Wang, Chen Gao, Yong Li, G. Wang, Depeng Jin, Jingbo Sun
{"title":"De-anonymization of Mobility Trajectories: Dissecting the Gaps between Theory and Practice","authors":"Huandong Wang, Chen Gao, Yong Li, G. Wang, Depeng Jin, Jingbo Sun","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2018.23211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2018.23211","url":null,"abstract":"Human mobility trajectories are increasingly collected by ISPs to assist academic research and commercial applications. Meanwhile, there is a growing concern that individual trajectories can be de-anonymized when the data is shared, using information from external sources (e.g. online social networks). To understand this risk, prior works either estimate the theoretical privacy bound or simulate de-anonymization attacks on synthetically created (small) datasets. However, it is not clear how well the theoretical estimations are preserved in practice. In this paper, we collected a large-scale ground-truth trajectory dataset from 2,161,500 users of a cellular network, and two matched external trajectory datasets from a large social network (56,683 users) and a check-in/review service (45,790 users) on the same user population. The two sets of large ground-truth data provide a rare opportunity to extensively evaluate a variety of de-anonymization algorithms (7 in total). We find that their performance in the real-world dataset is far from the theoretical bound. Further analysis shows that most algorithms have underestimated the impact of spatio-temporal mismatches between the data from different sources, and the high sparsity of user generated data also contributes to the underperformance. Based on these insights, we propose 4 new algorithms that are specially designed to tolerate spatial or temporal mismatches (or both) and model user behavior. Extensive evaluations show that our algorithms achieve more than 17% performance gain over the best existing algorithms, confirming our insights.","PeriodicalId":400085,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"426 1-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116567770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
H. Ritzdorf, K. Wüst, Arthur Gervais, Guillaume Felley, Srdjan Capkun
{"title":"TLS-N: Non-repudiation over TLS Enablign Ubiquitous Content Signing","authors":"H. Ritzdorf, K. Wüst, Arthur Gervais, Guillaume Felley, Srdjan Capkun","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2018.23272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2018.23272","url":null,"abstract":"An internet user wanting to share observed content is typically restricted to primitive techniques such as screenshots, web caches or share button-like solutions. These acclaimed proofs, however, are either trivial to falsify or require trust in centralized entities (e.g., search engine caches). This motivates the need for a seamless and standardized internet-wide non-repudiation mechanism, allowing users to share data from news sources, social websites or financial data feeds in a provably secure manner. Additionally, blockchain oracles that enable data-rich smart contracts typically rely on a trusted third party (e.g., TLSNotary or Intel SGX). A decentralized method to transfer webbased content into a permissionless blockchain without additional trusted third party would allow for smart contract applications to flourish. In this work, we present TLS-N, the first TLS extension that provides secure non-repudiation and solves both of the mentioned challenges. TLS-N generates non-interactive proofs about the content of a TLS session that can be efficiently verified by third parties and blockchain based smart contracts. As such, TLS-N increases the accountability for content provided on the web and enables a practical and decentralized blockchain oracle for web content. TLS-N is compatible with TLS 1.3 and adds a minor overhead to a typical TLS session. When a proof is generated, parts of the TLS session (e.g., passwords, cookies) can be hidden for privacy reasons, while the remaining content can be verified.","PeriodicalId":400085,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121085292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qi Alfred Chen, Yucheng Yin, Yiheng Feng, Z. Morley Mao, Henry X. Liu
{"title":"Exposing Congestion Attack on Emerging Connected Vehicle based Traffic Signal Control","authors":"Qi Alfred Chen, Yucheng Yin, Yiheng Feng, Z. Morley Mao, Henry X. Liu","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2018.23222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2018.23222","url":null,"abstract":"—Connected vehicle (CV","PeriodicalId":400085,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122113502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}