The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0001
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Three Corruption Scandals, Three Field Experiments","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption vulnerabilities turn to actual threats when officials calculate that the benefits of abusing their power are greater than the penalties associated with getting caught. By a similar logic, the formula for corruption control requires increasing the probability of detecting corruption (that is, of activating the eye) through enhanced monitoring and then credibly threatening to apply the appropriate penalty in response to wrongdoing (cracking the whip). As discussed in this introductory chapter, the present book contributes evidence-based recommendations on how societies can go about fighting bureaucratic corruption. The chapter describes the methodological rigor that characterizes the field experimental method, prior to summarizing three original and successive field experiments on corruption control. These experiments represent the book’s core contribution.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116763207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0003
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Corruption in the Built Environment","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides context. It stresses the harm caused by corruption in the built environment, while also briefly taking the pulse of corruption in Latin America and highlighting the vulnerability of local bureaucracies to this kind of corruption. This chapter summarizes three case studies of alleged corruption in Mexico City’s construction sector, thus uncovering the dubious tactics used by some developers. As is argued here, cities like Mexico City need not wait for major institutional reforms in order begin to control corruption in construction. Anticorruption audits can prove useful, especially if they are applied to the most sensitive bureaucratic processes.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124871682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0002
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Eye and Whip","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the overlap between corruption and inefficiency. This chapter also evaluates the merits of different accountability mechanisms featured in the existing literature, such as: vertical and horizontal accountability, fire alarm and police patrol oversight, and bottom-up and top-down monitoring. Irrespective of the accountability mechanism that is ultimately preferred, it seems clear that those who wish to promote integrity in government must, first, have the means to uncover wrongdoing, and, second, be in a credible position to threaten wrongdoers with punishment. Stated simply, additional layers of oversight will only have the intended effect if government officials sense that abusing their power has some probability of resulting in punishment.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128585216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0006
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Beyond the Duration of an Audit","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"How can corruption control achieve a lasting impact? That is the question that my coauthor Yanying Hao and I seek to answer in this chapter. New York City relies on the revenue it collects from property taxes. However, local tax assessors have been known to accept bribes in exchange for reducing properties’ tax burden. Given this risk of corruption, we describe a field experiment that builds on a formal collaboration with the local government in order to test for the systematic undervaluing of properties in the city. Out of 211 properties, one-third was randomly assigned to a control group. The other two-thirds were randomly assigned to receive anticorruption audits. If there was widespread corruption in the city’s property tax system, then properties in the control group would tend to be assessed at a lower value compared to the properties that received added scrutiny because of the experimental treatments. However, the empirical results do not bear this out—there is no statistical difference in how properties were assessed across the three study groups. From these results, my co-author and I conclude that New York City is at a vantage point when compared with other places that seemingly suffer from endemic corruption in their built environment. This chapter theorizes as to why this might be the case.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129052459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0004
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"The Eye Is Not Enough","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"As shown in Chapter 3, nonelected officials can and often do abuse their power. Hence, the question: under what conditions can anticorruption audits improve government accountability? In order to approach an answer, in this chapter, I describe a field experiment that relied on a unique collaboration with the city government of Querétaro in central Mexico. Fifty building permit applications were randomly assigned to enter into an experimental group. The officials responsible for reviewing the permits were made aware that, as an independent auditor, I was carefully examining all the physical documentation for applications within this group. The same permit reviewers did not realize that another set of fifty randomly selected permit applications were part of a comparison group and, thus, also subject to my scrutiny. This design tests whether permit reviewers improve their behavior when exposed to outside scrutiny. With implications for corruption control, the study’s results reveal that monitoring spurs greater diligence and stringency among officials, but only when they sense the risk of a top-down sanction. The eye is only effective when accompanied by a whip.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124995217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0007
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Ever-Brighter","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter summarizes the book’s central findings, addresses lingering questions, and delivers a conclusion. The chapter begins with a reminder of the corruption risks that are present across Latin America. Given the persistent problem of corruption, I again argue for the eye and whip approach to corruption control. Good things happen when targeted inspections of key government functions are supported by the credible threat of enforcement. The three field experiments featured in this book suggest that the eye and whip approach contributes to improved compliance with existing regulations and results in the more efficient use of public resources. Moreover, these studies do not lend support to concerns that intensified anticorruption efforts will unnecessarily burden the work of public administration.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122992750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eye and the WhipPub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0005
Paul Lagunes
{"title":"Scaling Up","authors":"Paul Lagunes","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577622.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the scalability and generalizability of an intervention like the one described in Chapter 4. In the construction of public works, a lack of accountability results in corruption and inefficiency. The question, then, is whether civil society oversight that is explicitly supported by a relevant public authority with sanctioning capacity will improve accountability. Or, as is sometimes argued, does the added scrutiny demoralize and distract officials, causing undesired delays? To approach an answer, this chapter describes a field experiment that builds on a sample of two hundred district governments in Peru. Half of the districts were randomly selected to enter into a control group. The other half received letters indicating that specific public works under their charge were being monitored by a civil society organization with the support of the country’s leading anticorruption agency. The results suggest that, even as districts in the two groups completed public works at a similar rate, the intervention lowered the cost of public works in the treatment group. This is evidence that the monitoring intervention resulted in overall efficiency gains.","PeriodicalId":394671,"journal":{"name":"The Eye and the Whip","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130315839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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