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Evolutionary Beliefs in Financial Market 金融市场的进化信念
Paris-Dauphine: Game Theory Pub Date : 2012-01-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2001035
E. Jouini, Clotilde Napp, Yannick Viossat
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引用次数: 17
Evolutionary Strategic Beliefs and Financial Markets 进化战略信念与金融市场
Paris-Dauphine: Game Theory Pub Date : 2011-06-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1946484
E. Jouini, Clotilde Napp, Yannick Viossat
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引用次数: 2
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