{"title":"Can She Really Take the Family Farm? Proposed Changes to Classification of Inherited Property in Mississippi Divorce Proceedings","authors":"Jacob Hamm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3772022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3772022","url":null,"abstract":"Is inherited property subject to equitable division in divorce proceedings? This is a question that the Mississippi appellate courts have long grappled with, and one that they are yet to decide on fully. The Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have provided three separate and conflicting methods for deciding classification of inherited property in divorce proceedings: (1) all inherited property is separate; (2) inherited property is marital in nature if it is commingled between the spouses to the point ownership is indistinguishable; and (3) inherited property is marital in nature if it is subject to use by the spouses/family during the course of the marriage. These three conflicting methods provided by the appellate courts fail to provide coherent guidelines for trial courts. This has caused inconsistent and unpredictable holdings, considered on a case by case basis, and decided solely on judicial discretion rather than well founded principles of law. <br><br>This article addresses each of Mississippi’s three current doctrines used to classify inherited property in divorce proceedings. It highlights the inconsistencies between the three, and discusses their strengths and shortcomings. The article then proposes a four-factor test that combines the existing precedents into one coherent method of classifying inherited property in divorce proceedings. The test first considers the non-inheriting spouse’s contribution to the upkeep and maintenance of the property. It then asks whether the property is the marital home. Next, the test considers whether commingling or familial use took place, and if so, to what extent. The final factor asks whether the inherited property constitutes more than half of the total marital estate. The article proposes that each factor constitute a point, and the inherited property be based on tallies from the four factors. This proposed factor test provides a clear and broadly applicable standard by which the state judiciary can consider all types of fact patterns and still have consistent, predictable, and equitable classifications of inherited property.<br>","PeriodicalId":387051,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Divorce & Dissolution (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126604949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Forfeiture and the Effect of Section 33A of the Wills Act 1837","authors":"B. Sloan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3751366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3751366","url":null,"abstract":"The forfeiture rule is “the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing”. Section 33A of the Wills Act 1837 (applicable to deaths on or after 1 February 2012) provides that “where a will contains a devise or bequest to a person who” “has been precluded by the forfeiture rule from acquiring it”, “[t]he person is, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, to be treated for the purposes of this Act as having died immediately before the testator”. On one view, any will is now simply read as if the forfeiting beneficiary has predeceased the testator. As this paper will explain, however, the phrase “for the purposes of this Act” has created unintended complications in the minds of some, with the potential considerably to reduce the impact of section 33A in an undesirable manner. The paper considers whether the problem with the scope of section 33A identified by some scholars is truly present, alongside what the solution to it might be.","PeriodicalId":387051,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Divorce & Dissolution (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125362687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Benefit System and Marriage Dissolution Among Working Families","authors":"Shilan Dargahi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3013092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3013092","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I use a tax and benefit micro-simulator of the U.K. welfare system to study the demographic challenges this country faces in relation to household formation. Specifically, I estimate to what extent the marriage penalties created by the welfare state can affect the divorce rate. The welfare system in the U.K subsidises the lone parenthood and the marriage penalties created by the system are found to be higher among low earning households. With the help of the tax and benefit simulator, I impute the counterfactual effect of divorce on the net benefit entitlements of a sub sample of working families. The traditional economic model of marriage implies that increasing public support for unmarried mothers generally increases the prevalence of single-headed households. My findings suggest that £100 weekly increase in marriage penalties increases the probability of divorce by around 7%.","PeriodicalId":387051,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Divorce & Dissolution (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124855109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: A Cautious Approach Required for Future Application","authors":"C. McConnell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2739451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2739451","url":null,"abstract":"The majority of commentary in the wake of Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd has focused on the Supreme Court’s discussion of a court’s jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil. This has overshadowed the Court’s decision to recognise a resulting trust, which achieved the same result as if the Court had pierced the corporate veil. The focus of this paper is on the Court’s recognition of a resulting trust. By assessing the position of key stakeholders affected by this decision, the author argues that any further application of Prest in New Zealand should be approached with caution.","PeriodicalId":387051,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Divorce & Dissolution (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115862951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}