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CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)最新文献

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Director-Liability-Reduction Laws and Conditional Conservatism 董事责任减少法与条件保守性
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2019-03-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2816617
Sudipta Basu, Yi Liang
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引用次数: 0
The Politics of Citations at the ECJ: Policy Preferences of EU Member State Governments and the Citation Behavior of Members of the European Court of Justice 欧洲法院的引文政治:欧盟成员国政府的政策偏好与欧洲法院法官的引文行为
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2017-01-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2778818
Jens Frankenreiter
{"title":"The Politics of Citations at the ECJ: Policy Preferences of EU Member State Governments and the Citation Behavior of Members of the European Court of Justice","authors":"Jens Frankenreiter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2778818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2778818","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the relationship between the political preferences of EU Member States and the behavior of judges at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by analyzing their citation behavior. It shows that judges at the ECJ are more likely to cite judgments authored by judges appointed by Member State governments with similar preferences regarding European integration. Analogous with the context of U.S. courts, non-random opinion assignment potentially threatens the validity of these results. To overcome this problem, I exploit the unique institutional setting at the ECJ to develop an improved identification strategy which builds on comparing the citations in two documents produced in the same case (i.e., the judgment and the opinion of the Advocate General). The findings in this paper provide evidence for the hypothesis that the political preferences of Member State governments are reflected in the behavior of the members of the ECJ.","PeriodicalId":382898,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122135066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
What Matters: Agreement between U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges 重要事项:美国上诉法院法官之间的协议
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2016-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2816492
Daniel L. Chen, Xing Cui, Lanyu Shang, Junchao Zheng
{"title":"What Matters: Agreement between U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges","authors":"Daniel L. Chen, Xing Cui, Lanyu Shang, Junchao Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2816492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2816492","url":null,"abstract":"Federal courts are a mainstay of the justice system in the United States. In this study, we analyze 387,898 cases from U.S. Courts of Appeals, where judges are randomly assigned to panels of three. We predict which judge dissents against co-panelists and analyze the dominant features that predict such dissent with a particular attention to the biographical features that judges share. Random forest, a method developed in Breiman (2001), achieves the best classification. Dissent is predominantly driven by case features, though personal features also predict agreement.","PeriodicalId":382898,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132765089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Another Welfare Effect of Insider Trading? An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading Around Seasoned Equity Offering in Japan 内幕交易的另一个福利效应?日本老练股票发行内幕交易实证分析
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2016-06-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2790713
Hatsuru Morita
{"title":"Another Welfare Effect of Insider Trading? An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading Around Seasoned Equity Offering in Japan","authors":"Hatsuru Morita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2790713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2790713","url":null,"abstract":"While it is well known that insider trading transfers wealth from uninformed market participants to informed insiders, it is not obvious whether insider trading bring welfare effect. This paper explores an answer to this issue, employing stock trading data around SEO in Japan. An announcement of SEO usually decreases the stock price of the issuing company, creating an opportunity for insiders to sell short before the announcement and to make benefit. If this short sale before the announcement lowers the final offering price, the insider trading reduced the financing amount of the issuing company and we can say that the insider trading caused a welfare loss. The paper tests whether this prediction holds employing Japanese stock market data. The paper does not find welfare loss caused by insider trading around SEO.","PeriodicalId":382898,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114380612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners 旁观者眼中的低质量专利:来自多个审查员的证据
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2016-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2807141
Gaétan de Rassenfosse, A. Jaffe, Elizabeth Webster
{"title":"Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners","authors":"Gaétan de Rassenfosse, A. Jaffe, Elizabeth Webster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2807141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807141","url":null,"abstract":"A low-quality patent system threatens to slow the pace of technological progress. Concerns about low patent quality are supported by estimates from litigation studies suggesting that most US patents granted should not have been issued. We propose a new model for measuring patent quality, based on equivalent patent applications submitted to multiple offices. Our method allows us to distinguish whether low-quality patents are issued because an office implements a low standard or because it violates its own standard. The results suggest that quality in patent systems is higher than previously thought. Specifically, the percentage of granted patents that are below each office’s own standard is under 10% for all offices. The Japanese patent office has a higher percentage of granted patents below its own standard than those from Europe, the USA, Korea, and China. This result arises from the fact that Japan has a higher standard than other offices. (JEL O34, K2, L4, F42)","PeriodicalId":382898,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116974310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
Value of a Law Degree by College Major 大学专业法律学位的价值
CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive) Pub Date : 2016-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2742674
Frank Mcintyre, M. Simkovic
{"title":"Value of a Law Degree by College Major","authors":"Frank Mcintyre, M. Simkovic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2742674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742674","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the increase in earnings from a law degree relative to a bachelor’s degree for graduates who majored in different fields in college. Students with humanities and social sciences majors comprise approximately 47 percent of law degree holders compared to 23 percent of terminal bachelor’s. Law degree earnings premiums are highest for humanities and social sciences majors and lowest for STEM majors. On the other hand, among those with law degrees, overall earnings are highest for STEM and Business Majors. This effect is fairly small at the low end of the earnings distribution, but quite large at the top end. The median annual law degree earnings premium ranges from approximately $29,000 for STEM majors to $45,000 for humanities majors.","PeriodicalId":382898,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2016 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"348 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125627790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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