{"title":"Allocation and Usage of Presidential Resources in Interbranch Bargaining","authors":"Philip D. Waggoner, Brandon Rottinghaus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2932242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932242","url":null,"abstract":"Executive-legislative bargaining operates with cost-benefit tradeoffs. Presidents possess several material options in leveraging Congressional support but also marshal these scarce resources. We argue presidents should strategically grant requests of members of Congress for a range of executive actions based upon the nature of the cost and the political context. Using an original dataset of 4,000 internal Congressional requests made during the Eisenhower, Ford, and H.W. Bush administrations, we are able to avoid endogeneity issues by examining when the president granted requests out of all requests made. We find that the president is highly strategic in granting requests, where the cost of the request is the most important consideration when deciding whether or not to approve legislator requests. Divided government enhances the president’s stinginess in granting requests to opposition party legislators. We conclude by highlighting the implications of institutional factors and constraints on the president’s resources in interbranch bargaining.","PeriodicalId":379445,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Legislative Relations (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126201577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Budgeting Was Easier: Eisenhower and the 1960 Budget","authors":"R. Penner","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12047","url":null,"abstract":"The paper looks back to time when budgeting was easier and budget outcomes were superior. Although it is impossible to replicate the past exactly, there are certain characteristics of past budgets that might be emulated. The paper focuses on Eisenhower's battles to balance the 1960 budget. The task was not easy and the result had to be bipartisan since Democrats had significant majorities in the House and Senate. But budgeting was less difficult than it is today, because almost all spending was controlled by annual appropriations, and popular, rapidly growing entitlements for the elderly were very much less important. The president's budget was also much more prestigious and influential. Approaches to gaining more control over entitlements are explored as is the more difficult task of restoring the influence of the president's budget.","PeriodicalId":379445,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Legislative Relations (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133104245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constitutional Craftsmanship and the Rule of Law: Organizational Arrangement, Moral Imagination, and the Separation of Powers","authors":"S. Rajagopalan, R. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2250935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2250935","url":null,"abstract":"Is \"rule of law\" anything more than a fictional allusion? After all, \"law\" is an abstract noun, and abstract nouns can't rule. Only people can rule. Rule of law is a fiction, one that has been around since ancient times. Whether, or under what circumstances, rule of law might be an ideal type rather than just a convenient fiction is the topic of this paper. For rule of law to be an ideal type that plausibly describes actual practice, it is necessary for governance to follow polycentric principles. This paper explores whether there are constitutional arrangements under which it could reasonably be claimed that governance reflects a deep level operation of a rule of law despite the surface level recognition rulership can be exercised only by people.","PeriodicalId":379445,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Legislative Relations (Topic)","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128004282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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