{"title":"Quine on Ontology","authors":"Gary Kemp, A. Lugg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a section-by-section discussion of chapter 7 of W. V. Quine’s Word and Object, ‘Ontic Decision’. After outlining Quine’s earlier thinking about ontology, it considers his handling of the subject in the chapter––his most careful treatment of ontology in his ‘classical’ period––and comments on how he downplayed the importance of the issue in later works. Among the topics examined are his qualms about nominalism, his plumping for physical objects and sets, his insistence on the difference between concrete general terms and abstract singular terms, his argument that ‘attribute’ and ‘proposition’ are no more referential than ‘sake’ and ‘mile’, his handling of ideal objects such as infinitesimals and geometrical objects, his analysis of ‘ordered pair’, ‘natural number’, and other notions that require paraphrasing rather than elimination, his view of semantic ascent and how he views the philosophical project. Throughout the chapter attends to Quine’s emphasis on science, not common sense.","PeriodicalId":377575,"journal":{"name":"Quine, Structure, and Ontology","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124953362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On What Exists","authors":"Nathan Salmón","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Quine’s criterion of theoretical ontological commitment is subject to a variety of interpretations, all of which save one yield incorrect verdicts. Moreover, the interpretation that yields correct verdicts is not what Quine meant. Instead the intended criterion unfairly imputes ontological commitments to theories that lack those commitments and fails to impute commitments to theories that have them. Insofar as Quine’s criterion is interpreted so that it yields only correct verdicts, it is trivial and of questionable utility. Moreover, the correct criterion invokes analyticity, a notion that Quine spent most of his life tirelessly combating. This yields a dilemma for Quinean philosophy: either his criterion of ontological commitment is incorrect, or else Quine is committed to a traditional philosophical notion that he emphatically rejected as disreputable.","PeriodicalId":377575,"journal":{"name":"Quine, Structure, and Ontology","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133654097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}