{"title":"Autonomy of Military Robots: Assessing the Technical and Legal (“Jus In Bello”) Thresholds, 32 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 57 (2016)","authors":"Remus Titiriga","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2602160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2602160","url":null,"abstract":"While robots are still absent from our homes, they have started to spread over battlefields. However, the military robots of today are mostly remotely controlled platforms, with no real autonomy. This paper will disclose the obstacles in implementing autonomy for such systems by answering a technical question: What level of autonomy is needed in military robots and how and when might it be achieved, followed by a techno-legal one: How to implement the rules of humanitarian law within autonomous fighting robots, in order to allow their legal deployment? The first chapter scrutinizes the significance of autonomy in robots and the metrics used to quantify it, which were developed by the US Department of Defense. The second chapter focuses on the autonomy of \"state-of-the-art” robots (e.g.; Google’s self-driving car, DARPA’s projects, etc.) for navigation, ISR or lethal missions. Based on public information, we will get a hint of the architectures, the functioning, the thresholds and technical limitations of such systems. The bottleneck to a higher autonomy of robots seems to be their poor “perceptive intelligence.” The last chapter looks to the requirements of humanitarian law (rules of “jus in bello”/rules of engagement) to the legal deployment of autonomous lethal robots on the battlefields. The legal and moral reasoning of human soldiers, complying with humanitarian law, is a complex cognitive process which must be emulated by autonomous robots that could make lethal decisions. However, autonomous completion of such “moral” tasks by artificial agents is much more challenging than the autonomous implementation of other tasks, such as navigation, ISR or kinetic attacks. Given the limits of current Artificial Intelligence, it is highly unlikely that robots will acquire such moral capabilities anytime soon. Therefore, for the time being, the autonomous weapon systems might be legally deployed, but only in very particular circumstances, where the requirements of humanitarian law happen to be irrelevant. 2015] AUTONOMY OF MILITARY ROBOTS 59 I. THE MEANING OF AUTONOMY IN ROBOTS AND WAYS TO QUANTIFY IT A) DEFINING AUTONOMY IN ROBOTS The term “robot” is based on the Czech word “robota,” meaning “serf or slave,” and came into being in Karel Capek’s 1921 play R.U.R. (Rosumovi Univerzalni Roboti or Rossum’s Universal Robots). Today, a robot is defined as “a mechanical creature which can function autonomously.”2 This concept of autonomy is correlated but different from automation. While both processes can be executed independently, from start to finish without human intervention, there is a qualitative distinction between them. An automated system normally operates with no human intervention, but is not self-directed and lacks decision-making capabilities. It only replaces routine processes with software/hardware that follows a step-by-step order, which usually requires human supervision. In a certain way, an automated system is rigid, blind, and, one might s","PeriodicalId":376541,"journal":{"name":"The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124194573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Policing of Religious Marriage Prohibitions in Israel: Religion, State, and Information Technology, 31 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 23 (2014)","authors":"A. Miller","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2431756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2431756","url":null,"abstract":"The State of Israel applies religious law in all matters of marriage and divorce. For the Jewish population of Israel, the law of marriage includes religious prohibitions on certain kinds of marriages, most notably the prohibition against intermarriage and the prohibition against marrying a mamzer. Over the years, Israel‘s state-religious authorities have adopted a variety of methods and practices for policing these prohibitions. These include stringent procedures for premarital registration inquiries; use of databases for collecting information on prohibited persons; recording the possibility of mamzer status of newborn children; special Beit Din proceedings for handling cases of possible marriage prohibitions; Beit Din-initiated investigations of possible prohibited persons, including minors; and special ―Jewishness investigations‖ for people of questionable Jewish ancestry. This article surveys the law and practice of these policing methods, as well as the acute social problems and injustices they cause. Lastly, this article discusses ways in which these methods change traditional Jewish marriage norms of information dissemination.","PeriodicalId":376541,"journal":{"name":"The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114830725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stuxnet as Cyberwarfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield, 29 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1 (2011)","authors":"J. Richardson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1892888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1892888","url":null,"abstract":"In the field of international humanitarian law, there are a number of questions about the conduct of warfare in the cyber domain. In some cases, answers can be gleaned from treaties and customary international law but in other instances, solutions are seemingly intractable, begging for solutions that may only be answered by technology itself. From a legal perspective, such oversimplifications trivialize humanitarian law as well as other legal constructs already struggling to address complex issues in the cyber realm.It is within this context that this paper focuses on a recent event known as Stuxnet, a computer virus that infected and damaged a nuclear research facility in Natanz, Iran. Reflecting on this particular cyber attack, this paper addresses two IHL issues: Does the Stuxnet attack rise to the level of an armed attack within the meaning of international humanitarian law? If so, did it adhere to the two core principles of IHL, namely distinction and proportionality? This paper finds that the Stuxnet attack does in fact rise to the level of an armed attack within the meaning of IHL and adheres to the principles of distinction and proportionality.","PeriodicalId":376541,"journal":{"name":"The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128445524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Internet Filtering: The Ineffectiveness of WTO Remedies and the Availability of Alternative Tort Remedies, 28 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 273 (2010)","authors":"Kristen A. Knapp","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1623025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1623025","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, Internet filtering, while not a new phenomenon, has grown both in the United States and across the globe. Empirical studies by organizations such as OpenNet Initiative show the pervasiveness of government filtering is increasing worldwide. Increasingly, private actors, such as Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), have taken on filtering responsibilities. Moreover, recent technological innovations, particularly a change in the types of devices accessing the Internet, will make Internet regulation and consequently filtering easier to accomplish in the future. As a result of these developments, commentators have recently begun to speculate, after the decision by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, whether some Internet filtering might violate WTO commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS Agreement”). This paper addresses two possible legal responses to the rise of Internet filtering. First, the paper argues that U.S. Internet filtering practices generally do not violate U.S. GATS commitments. Rather, the WTO’s decision in U.S.-Gambling Services was unique and unlikely to be repeated because (1) the U.S. is predominately an exporter of electronic services and not an importer, and (2) the U.S.-Gambling Services decision resulted from a denial of market access. Instead, those seeking to impose legal liability for U.S. filtering practices should pursue tort remedies, specifically for tortious interference in contractual relations. Although there are only a limited number of cases that have applied the tort of intentional interference in contractual relations in the Internet context, those precedents suggest plaintiffs can recover provided they establish that the filtering was both intentional and improper. The outlook is similarly positive for at-will relationships, which require proof of similar elements as contractual relationships.","PeriodicalId":376541,"journal":{"name":"The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130682099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures, 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 189 (1997)","authors":"B. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.15090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.15090","url":null,"abstract":"Toute signature de document implique un risque, que la signature se fasse manuellement ou de maniere electronique. Afin de controler les signatures electroniques deux strategies ont ete developpees et sont decrites par l'A. : celle de la cryptographie et celle de la biometrie du stylo (PenOp qui se caracterise par son service de capture de signature et par son service de verification de signature)","PeriodicalId":376541,"journal":{"name":"The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122137185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}