Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0008
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"The Place of Expert Intuition in Philosophy","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The Standard Picture of philosophical methodology includes the following claims: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind; (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology; (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning; (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Negative experimental philosophers accept claims (A), (B), and (C), but challenge (D). This chapter develops a variant on the expertise defense of traditional philosophy. The defense hinges on denying (C) in the Standard Picture: philosophers do not treat their intuitions as data; they treat their intuitions as observations that can be improved through reasoning. The chapter explores both historical antecedents in the rationalist tradition, and descriptive accuracy with respect to current practice.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125624165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0006
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"Cognitive Penetration, Expertise, and Background Information","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Can the way that an experience is caused make a difference to what that experience justifies believing? Presentational Conservatism implies that the answer to this question is no. It thereby incurs two explanatory burdens. One is to explain the apparent epistemic downgrade in cases such as Susanna Siegel’s example of Jack looking angry to Jill because of her unjustified fear. Another explanatory burden is to explain the superior epistemic position of expert perceivers such as bird watchers and radiologists whose trained eyes allow them to see more than those with untrained eyes. This chapter argues that Presentational Conservatism has adequate resources to discharge both explanatory burdens.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122727367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0007
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"The Standard Picture","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The Standard Picture of philosophical methodology includes the following claims: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind; (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology; (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning; (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Work in negative experimental philosophy has motivated some to question the descriptive accuracy of the Standard Picture. Some philosophers such as Timothy Williamson challenge (A) on the grounds that philosophy cannot be distinguished by its reliance on a distinctive epistemic source. Other philosophers such as Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch challenge (B) on the grounds that philosophers do not treat intuitions as evidence. This chapter defends (A) and (B) in the Standard Picture against these challenges.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129433824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0003
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Modularity","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Experience Thesis, perceptual expertise is a capacity that manifests itself in perceptual experiences with expertise-specific representational contents. The first part of the chapter locates the Experience Thesis with respect to current debates about the admissible contents of perceptual experience and gives various reasons for believing that it is true. The balance of the chapter explores its compatibility with two other theses about perception and perceptual expertise. One is the Cognition Thesis that perceptual expertise is a capacity that draws on cognition. The other is the Modularity Thesis that perceptual experiences wholly result from modular processing of sensory input.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"319 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123937245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0004
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"The Accessibility of Expert Intuition","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"We talk each other into having intuitions in a way that we do not talk each other into having perceptual experiences. The Accessibility Thesis marks one key manifestation of this phenomenon. It states that novices can have intuitions that have the same representational contents as intuitions that are the result of expert intuition. This chapter develops a setting for thinking about expert intuition that explains the Accessibility Thesis. The setting promises to illuminate a wider range of phenomena such as general improvements in intuition and episodes of talking each other into intuitions in which no one is assumed to be expert.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116752275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forming ImpressionsPub Date : 2020-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0002
Elijah Chudnoff
{"title":"Locating Expert Impressions","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The category of expert impressions includes expert perceptions and expert intuitions. This category does not fit easily into the standard classification of expertise into perceptual, cognitive, or motor. This chapter argues that there are independent reasons to prefer an alternative system for classifying expertise with reference to which expert impressions stand out as a natural class. The argument is based on empirical considerations suggesting that the traditional category of cognitive expertise is disunified: some kinds of cognitive expertise are more like perceptual expertise; other kinds of cognitive expertise are more like motor expertise.","PeriodicalId":374993,"journal":{"name":"Forming Impressions","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121832607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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