European Contract Law and the Creation of Norms最新文献

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Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value 诚信是合同的核心价值
European Contract Law and the Creation of Norms Pub Date : 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.1017/9781839701412.002
Daniel Markovits
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引用次数: 0
Default Rules Beyond a State: Special-Purpose Lawmakers in the Platform Economy 超越国家的违约规则:平台经济中的特殊目的立法者
European Contract Law and the Creation of Norms Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3641439
M. Grochowski
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引用次数: 0
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