{"title":"Solving Linear Difference Systems with Lagged Expectations by a Method of Undetermined Coefficients","authors":"Pengfei Wang, Y. Wen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.875765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.875765","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a solution method to solve linear difference models with lagged expectations. Variables with lagged expectations expand the model's state space greatly when N is large; and getting the system into a canonical form solvable by the traditional methods involves substantial manual work (e.g., arranging the state vector and the associated coefficient matrices to accommodate variables with lagged expectations), which is prone to human errors. Our method avoids the need of expanding the state space of the system and shifts the burden of analysis from the individual economist/model solver toward the computer. Hence it can be a very useful tool in practice, especially in testing and estimating economics models with a high order of lagged expectations. Examples are provided to demonstrate the usefulness of the method. We also discuss the implications of lagged expectations on the equilibrium properties of indeterminate DSGE models, such as the serial correlation properties of sunspots shocks in these models.","PeriodicalId":369514,"journal":{"name":"Hong Kong: Economics (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122705594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Return Anomalies on the Nikkei: Are They Statistical Illusions?","authors":"J. Batten, Craig Ellis, Thomas A. Fetherston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.396680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.396680","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the sensitivity of the long-term return anomaly observed on the Nikkei stock index to sample and method bias using daily data from the period 3 January 1980 to 31 October 2000. Initially, the CUSUM statistic is employed to identify sub-periods of sign shifts in the mean returns. We find that the null hypothesis of no long-term dependence is accepted for the whole sample and every sub-period using the modified rescaled range test, but not using the classical rescaled adjusted range test. We conclude that researchers may inadvertently introduce sample and method bias into their studies of the time series properties of the Nikkei unless sample period and method are considered.","PeriodicalId":369514,"journal":{"name":"Hong Kong: Economics (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127934981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Grabbing Hands to Helping Hands","authors":"Jiahua Che","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.180715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.180715","url":null,"abstract":"I present a study of ownership of firms under government rent seeking. Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such a government rent seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership is shown to serve as a second best commitment mechanism through which the government agency will restrain itself from the rent seeking activity and even offer the manager support and favor such as tax breaks and subsidies. This mechanism works at a cost as government ownership compromises ex post managerial incentives and creates distortion in resource allocation. Nevertheless, under some fairly general conditions, government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership. The analysis corresponds to a host of stylized empirical observations concerning local government owned firms during China's transition to a market economy. Based on this analysis, I suggest that local government owned firms will be transformed to private ownership as China's input markets become more liberalized.","PeriodicalId":369514,"journal":{"name":"Hong Kong: Economics (Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115159136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}