LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Система Социального Обеспечения Населения России На Региональном Уровне (Social Regional Level Welfare System: Russia)","authors":"I. Togunov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2681234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2681234","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В исследовании представлены отдельные тезисы системы социального обеспечения населения России и некоторые положения социальной поддержки жителей региона, на примере Владимирской области.English Abstract: Few particular principles of the population social welfare are reflected in the research. As well as few social regional level welfare regulations of the Vladimir Region.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129660896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Distributive Justice and Distributed Obligations","authors":"W. Edmundson","doi":"10.1163/17455243-46810065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810065","url":null,"abstract":"Collectivities, that is, groups constituted by some procedure for making group decisions, can be agents. Collectivities can be moral agents if they can appreciate and act upon moral reasons. Collectivities thus can have obligations that are not simply the aggregate of pre-existing obligations of their members. Certain kinds of collective obligation distribute over their membership, i.e., become members' obligations to do a fair share to fulfill the collectivity's obligation. In incremental good cases, i.e., those in which a member's fair share would go part way toward fulfilling the collectivity's obligation, each member has an unconditional obligation to contribute that share. That is to say, in incremental good cases, each member's distributed duty is not conditional upon other members' contributions.States are collectivities, and states can be moral agents bearing obligations. But states are involuntary collectivities, which means that their obligations do not as a general matter distribute to their citizens. But certain states, democratic legal states, express the will of all citizens sufficiently well to count them among collectivities whose obligations distribute over their members. The qualifications to count as a democratic legal state are not as rigorous as those of a fully just state. In particular, a democratic legal state need only guarantee a social minimum, and need not satisfy more plausible but exacting principles of justice, such as Rawls' first-principle guarantee of the fair value of political liberty, or the difference principle.A democratic legal state bears an obligation to be just and to do justice. This includes matters of distributive justice and addresses, in particular, unequal accumulations of wealth. Many existing states are democratic legal states, but none satisfies more rigorous but still plausible requirements of distributive justice (Rawlsian or other). In these states, citizens who hold assets, which are in excess of what is just, bear a distributed duty to donate that excess to benefit those with less. It is an incremental good case, and thus is not conditioned on the conformity of others who are also wealthier than justice allows, nor on the diligence of the state in meeting its obligations. This inconvenient conclusion is not avoidable by complaining of its demandingness, nor by appeal to the abstract possibility that some duties are conditional upon being determined and effectively enforced by the state.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126125130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Poverty in Asia and the Pacific: An Update","authors":"Guanghua Wan, Iva Sebastian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1919973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1919973","url":null,"abstract":"Poverty reduction in the Asia and the Pacific region in 2005–2008 had been quite significant. Despite the global crisis, an estimated 150 million people exited extreme poverty by 2008—from 903.4 million in 2005 to 753.5 million, bringing the percentage of people living under the $1.25 per day poverty line to 21.9% from 27.1% in 2005. Poverty reduction was uneven across countries and between subregions. East Asia—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—outperformed the rest. Unfortunately, for a few countries there had been an increase in the number of poor—under both the $1.25 and $2 per day poverty lines. This can be attributed to faster population growth than poverty reduction. The ranking of the large poor countries remained the same. In 2008, India continued as home to the largest number of the region's poor, followed by the PRC, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan. While a significant number moved out of extreme poverty, the number of moderately poor— those living between $1.25 and $2 per day—dropped only marginally, by around 18.4 million. Using the $2 per day poverty line, 47.4% of the region's total population or 1.63 billion can be classified as poor in 2008. Fourteen of the 25 Asian Development Bank (ADB) developing member countries (DMCs) had headcount ratios above 40%. In particular, poverty reduction was slower in low-income DMCs than the others under both the $1.25 and $2 per day poverty lines, implying the need for continued financial support for poverty reduction. Due to the global crisis, poverty reduction became slower. Between 2008 and 2009, based on projections, the number of the poor is estimated to have increased in 9 and 10 of the 25 DMCs, under the $1.25 per day and $2 poverty lines, respectively. Asia and the Pacific region remains home to the largest number of the world’s poor. In 2008, around 63% of the poor worldwide lived in the region.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131316055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Di Bao: A Guaranteed Minimum Income in Urban China?","authors":"Shaohua Chen, M. Ravallion, Youjuan Wang","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-3805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3805","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about incentives and targeting naturally arise when cash transfers are used to fight poverty. The authors address these concerns in the context of China's Di Bao program, which uses means-tested transfers to try to assure that no registered urban resident has an income below a stipulated poverty line. There is little sign in the data of poverty traps due to high benefit withdrawal rates. Targeting performance is excellent by various measures. Di Bao appears to be better targeted than any other program in the developing world. However, all but one measure of targeting performance is found to be uninformative, or even deceptive, about impacts on poverty. The authors find that the majority of the poor are not receiving help, even with a generous allowance for measurement errors. While on paper, Di Bao would eliminate urban poverty, it falls well short of that ideal in practice.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114755972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who Cares About Relative Deprivation?","authors":"M. Ravallion, Michael Lokshin","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-3782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3782","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of relative deprivation predict negative welfare effects when friends and neighbors become better-off. Other theories point to likely positive benefits. The authors encompass both views within a single model, which motivates their tests using a survey for Malawi that collected data on satisfaction with life, own economic welfare, and the perceived welfare of friends and neighbors. Their methods help address likely biases in past tests found in the literature. In marked contrast to research for industrial countries, the authors find that relative deprivation is generally not a concern for most of their sample, although it does appear to matter to the comparatively well off. Their results provide a welfarist explanation for the priority given to absolute poverty in poor countries. The pattern of externalities also suggests that there will be too much poverty and inequality in this economy, even judged solely from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115026809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'Can You Hear Me Now?': Making Participatory Governance Work for the Poor","authors":"Jaime Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2485325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485325","url":null,"abstract":"Participatory governance engages people who are affected by a problem in the process of solving it. A participatory-governance approach to inner-city crime, for example, might include local residents in the process of designing a community-policing program. In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to tackle complex problems of law and public policy. Some herald the potential for participatory-governance schemes to improve legal and policy outcomes, increase institutional accountability, empower marginalized groups, and further democratic ideals of self-determination and equality. Yet participatory-governance schemes can also promote the capture of public power by private interests, the evasion of accountability, and the deepening subordination of already marginalized communities. This is especially true when marginalized stakeholders are unable to meaningfully participate in the process.This article seeks to articulate a conceptual framework for better promoting meaningful participation by marginalized stakeholders. To do so, it draws a seemingly unlikely parallel between participatory governance systems and business transactions. Applying the framework to both court-based and non-court-based systems, it analyzes how various mechanisms might be used to promote meaningful participation by marginalized stakeholders. It concludes that where such participation cannot actively be promoted, the participatory approach should be rejected in favor of other problem-solving methods.","PeriodicalId":367202,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Poverty Law (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114533825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}