{"title":"Pirates: and What You Can Do About Them","authors":"Joseph Godfrey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3452299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452299","url":null,"abstract":"Piracy may seem antiquated, but it is still a very real threat to the maritime industry with an annual cost of several billion dollars. This problem stems from 'pirate' being too good a job (in a very literal sense) to pass up. Piracy pays a lot, and pirates face virtually no repercussions for doing it, even in the event of capture. For reasons including piracy laws that are simply not robust enough for contemporary pirates, procedural inadequacies, and the practise of bribing judges and prison guards, pirates remain undeterred in their endeavours. This article aims to provide a thorough overview of what constitutes maritime piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its differing domestic interpretations, and the reasons why people become pirates. The article also poses some solutions as to what can be done to mitigate the effects of piracy, including insurance and private security, and asks if pirates could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. Solutions to 'solve' piracy, such as an international pirate court, are also touched upon.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126975514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defining Death-Eligible Murder in China","authors":"Michelle Miao","doi":"10.1093/AJCL/AVZ017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJCL/AVZ017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The central purpose of this Article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing regime for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murderer’s eligibility for execution. The reform heralded a substantial decline in the number of capital sentences, as well as a rise of an alternative to execution: the suspended death sentence. In the reform era, how do Chinese courts determine who should be spared from execution and who deserves the ultimate punishment of death? This Article uses a quantitative analysis of 369 capital murder cases, as well as elite interviews with forty judges—from China’s provincial-level Higher People’s Courts and the Supreme People’s Court—to analyze the political logic behind Chinese courts’ approach to defining the execution worthiness of convicted murderers. While there is a rich literature on capital sentencing in the United States, there is a dearth of comparative analysis of the challenges Chinese courts face in drawing the distinction between life and death sentences in the country’s unique social and political context. This Article seeks to make a contribution to this crucial topic.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129065668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ranks of Corrupt Officials, the Legal Institutional Design and the Distortion of Corruption Punishment","authors":"Hongli Chu, Shengmin Sun, Jian Wei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3062365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3062365","url":null,"abstract":"Based on the bribery judgment of first instance that was published by the Chinese court in 2014, we conduct the first empirical study of the relationships among the ranks of corrupt officials, legal institutional design and corruption punishment. When analyzing only the relationship between the ranks of corrupt officials and the severity of punishment, there is a distorted representation that the corruption punishment of higher-level corrupt officials is lighter. However, by considering the legal system design and controlling for the diminishing marginal effect of corruption punishment, the influences of high-ranking corrupt officials on corruption punishment change, the sentence lengths of the high-ranking corrupt officials are not shorter but longer, and the introduction of the discretionary factor of the judge also proves that judges tend to punish high-ranking corrupt officials more heavily. Thus, the cause of corruption punishment distortion is mainly due to the lag in the adjustment of the criminal law.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116679003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Prison?: An Economic Critique","authors":"P. Salib","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2928219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2928219","url":null,"abstract":"This Article argues that we should not imprison people who commit crimes. This is true despite the fact that essentially all legal scholars, attorneys, judges, and laypeople see prison as the sine qua non of a criminal justice system. Without prison, most would argue, we could not punish past crimes, deter future crimes, or keep dangerous criminals safely separate from the rest of society. Scholars of law and economics have generally held the same view, treating prison as an indispensable tool for minimizing social harm. But the prevailing view is wrong. Employing the tools of economic analysis, this Article demonstrates that prison imposes enormous but well-hidden societal losses. It is therefore a deeply inefficient device for serving the utilitarian aims of the criminal law system — namely, optimally deterring bad social actors while minimizing total social costs. The Article goes on to engage in a thought experiment, asking whether an alternative system of criminal punishment could serve those goals more efficiently. It concludes that there exist economically superior alternatives to prison available right now. The alternatives are practicable. They plausibly comport with our current legal rules and more general moral principles. They could theoretically be implemented tomorrow, and, if we wished, we could bid farewell forever to our sprawling, socially-suboptimal system of imprisonment.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125560131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"'Introduction' - The Transformation of Property Regimes and Transitional Justice in Central Eastern Europe. In Search of a Theory","authors":"Liviu Damşa","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-48530-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48530-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122360678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not Only ‘Context’: Why Transitional Justice Programs Can No Longer Ignore Violations of Economic and Social Rights","authors":"Sam Szoke-Burke","doi":"10.7916/D8DJ5G0Z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8DJ5G0Z","url":null,"abstract":"Transitional justice programs traditionally focused on breaches of civil and political rights and violations of bodily integrity, largely ignoring violations of economic and social rights (ESRs) and relegating socioeconomic issues to the category of ‘background’ or context. This approach is becoming increasingly untenable given that ESRs articulate binding and increasingly justiciable legal obligations. Considering past ESR violations can also provide crucial insight into the causes of past conflict, and addressing socioeconomic grievances can help to reduce the chances of future rights violations or civil unrest. This Article sets out when transitional justice ought concern itself with breaches of ESRs using the ‘respect, protect, fulfill’ framework of state obligations. Drawing on past examples, the Article argues that failures to respect and protect ESRs are usually discrete enough to be included in the mandates of truth commissions, reparations schemes, and, in some cases, criminal prosecutions. Decentralization programs and the vetting of corrupt economic actors can also effectively address past ESR violations and lead to socioeconomic improvements. Addressing state failures to fulfill ESRs is a more complicated question, although there are occasions where such violations should be included in transitional justice mandates. Ultimately, transitional justice can no longer ignore that ESRs articulate non-negotiable and clearly defined standards, which often hold the key to stable and sustainable political transitions.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124027252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of a Simpler Criminal Procedure on Criminal Case Outcomes: Evidence from Czech District-Level Data","authors":"L. Dušek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2564668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2564668","url":null,"abstract":"The paper estimates the effects of a simpler criminal procedure on case durations and the probabilities that the defendant is charged and convicted. The identification strategy exploits a policy reform in the Czech Republic as a quasi-natural experiment. The reform allowed petty offenses to be prosecuted via a simplified (fast-track) procedure but its actual implementation varied substantially across districts. The fast-track procedure reduced the average duration of the police/prosecutor phase of the criminal procedure by 27 days on average for the petty offenses. It increased the probability that the suspect is charged by 6 percentage points. The fast-track procedure released resources that could potentially be spent on prosecuting serious crimes; I therefore investigate for spillover effects. I find only weak evidence of such spillover effects on the probability that the suspect is charged and no evidence of spillover effects on other case outcomes.","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132753248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking the Profit out of Organised Crime","authors":"Michael D’Ascenzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088300","url":null,"abstract":"As any literary detective will tell you, you can often pin the crime on the right criminal when you work out who among the suspects stood to profit. This idea is in fact ancient: the Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca said in the first century AD, 'who profits by a crime commits it.' He also said 'he who does not prevent a crime encourages it.'","PeriodicalId":365659,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Criminal Law (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121383775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}