The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0003
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Non-deviant Causation","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of deviant causation has long vexed causalist accounts of action. This chapter argues that an account of non-deviant causation can be developed by leveraging insights from the author’s account of control. In order to understand what happens when non-deviant causation happens, it develops the notion of a comprehensive set of circumstances. This is a set of circumstances that is derived by building a causal model that includes an agent, a plan, and the agent’s location in a particular situation. What is special about the model is that it gets the causal parameters of the particular situation right. Non-deviant causation then turns out to be the normal production of behavior that is, for the agent, normal given the plan and across the comprehensive set of circumstances. After developing this account, this chapter discusses a range of problem cases for it, examines an alternative account due to Wayne Wu, and discusses how the account fares against some complaints drawn from relevant literature.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115625065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0006
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"The Shape of Agency","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"After offering accounts of basic building blocks of agency in chapters 2 through 5, this chapter serves as a hinge. Here, drawing on Tyler Burge’s work on primitive agency, this chapter discusses the most primitive features of agency, and considers what must be added to work towards more sophisticated kinds of agent. The main aim is to articulate a kind of (metaphorical) ladder that allows us to see, not only the shape of agency in relief, but also the place of key capacities like a capacity for representation of targets for behavior, and a capacity of practical reasoning. This leads, at the chapter’s very end, to a brief discussion of the role of mental action in an understanding of agency.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114842118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0005
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Intentional Action","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The project of analyzing intentional action has been out of favor for some time. In part this is due to exhaustion over details—accounts are usually subject to very technical problems or elaborate counterexamples. This chapter builds build on the earlier accounts of control and non-deviance to offer a new account of intentional action. This account builds on Mele and Moser’s influential work, and goes beyond it in some ways. After offering the account, this chapter considers a range of ancillary issues and problem cases. It discusses, for example, side-effect cases, senseless movements, the role of belief and knowledge in intentional action, and action theoretic versions of systematic Gettier cases. Finally, it turns to issues of reductionism that motivate some rejections of causal theories of action. The upshot is that anti-causalists have a new account to contend with, and one that has answers to the problems often thought to be damning for causalism.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131786965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0008
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Knowledgeable Action","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops an account of a different mode of agentive excellence. This one essentially involves knowledge of action and knowledge of how to act. Here we call it knowledgeable action. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, to explain the special epistemic features often thought to hold of knowledge of action. Second, to explain how this knowledge plays an important role in action execution. Along the way this chapter discusses various accounts of knowledge of action, which variously emphasize roles for intention, perception, and conscious awareness. Towards the end, the chapter compares and contrast the author’s account to nearby accounts that focus, not on knowledgeable action, but on knowledge how.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125685243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0004
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Varietals of Control’s Exercise","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198866411.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter first offers a clear explication of control’s exercise. It then briefly discusses control over omissions, before turning to a discussion of different varietals of control. So, in particular, voluntary control is central to several debates in philosophy. No acceptable account exists. This chapter extends the account of control to offer an explication of voluntary control. It then discusses this account in light of Alfred Mele’s recent work on direct control. Finally, this chapter offers an explication of a notion that is important to many who think and write about free will. This is the notion of what is “up to” an agent. The explication turns on the notion of voluntary control.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133538056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Shape of AgencyPub Date : 2021-01-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0009
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concludes. Its aim is primarily summary and paraphrase, and placing the ideas developed in this book side by side. Cormac McCarthy is gratuitously quoted. And then the chapter brings reflection back to the metaphorical distinction between activity and passivity with which the book began. On the picture the book develops, agents become active by degree, in various ways. With the exercise of control, the passive becomes active, and plans give rise to intentional action. With the development of skill, capacities for planning and for exercising control and for executing intentional action begin to cover broad differences of circumstance. With the acquisition of knowledge, agents are able to impose their will on parts of the world that their practice may not have adequately prepared them for. In knowledgeable action, agents exert change in the world in part by figuring out the world they change.","PeriodicalId":357127,"journal":{"name":"The Shape of Agency","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127603943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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