{"title":"Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading","authors":"Allen H. Huang, Kai Wai Hui, Yue Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3947898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947898","url":null,"abstract":"Extant evidence suggests that liberal judges prefer stricter securities enforcement to protect innocent investors. We find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges perform fewer opportunistic insider sales, consistent with managers taking judges’ political ideology into consideration. This deterrent effect is stronger when insiders are more likely to be sued. The SEC also considers judge ideology when selecting litigation venues. Finally, we validate that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading cases. Overall, we provide the first evidence demonstrating the importance of judicial discretion and judge political ideology in deterring opportunistic insider trading.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126400244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Speculators Exacerbate Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Margin Traders in China","authors":"Jun Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3950960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950960","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits a regulatory experiment that lifts the margin trading ban in China to examine the real effects of speculative retail investors. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that margin trading eligibility causes an increase in share turnover and stock prices, and that marginable firms cater to investor short-termism by manipulating earnings and reducing long-term investment. Consistent with managerial myopia, marginable firms experience a decline in operating profit and equity valuation in the long run. My results suggest that margin traders, as short-term speculators, pressure the manager to focus on current earnings and sacrifice long-term growth.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124775486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Salient Climatic Risks Affect Shareholder Voting?","authors":"Eliezer M. Fich, Guosong Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3895071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895071","url":null,"abstract":"Shareholders in locations recently hit by hurricanes significantly increase their support for environmental proposals even if they never previously voted for similar initiatives. Our results show that changed beliefs about salient climate risks rather than firms’ fundamentals drive the increased support. More favorable voting following a hurricane strike has real consequences: Climate-related proposals are more likely to pass, and when they do, firm performance weakens. These findings highlight the role of investor psychology in altering shareholders’ perceptions about climate risks and, consequently, their support for corporate environmental policies.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"77 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123183109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Origin of IPO Profits","authors":"David C. Brown, S. Kovbasyuk, Tamara Nefedova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3947927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947927","url":null,"abstract":"I use administrative and survey-based micro data to study the relationship between expectation errors, belief updates, and subsequent corporate decisions of a representative sample of French entrepreneurs. After overestimating their development and hiring prospects, optimistic entrepreneurs update downward, entrepreneurs who underestimate their prospects update upward. Although optimistic and pessimistic types are persistent over time, I show that expectation errors decline over time within individuals, suggesting that entrepreneurs learn from their past errors over time. Making errors and learning from them have real effects. The ability to correctly forecast growth and update after an error lead to better start-ups' performance.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131324617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yongheng Deng, Congyan Han, Teng Li, Timothy J. Riddiough
{"title":"Whither Weather?: High Temperature, Climate Change and Mortgage Default","authors":"Yongheng Deng, Congyan Han, Teng Li, Timothy J. Riddiough","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3947955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947955","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the relationship between temperature and residential mortgage default using fine-scale weather information and comprehensive loan performance data. Conditional on a rich set of default risk controls and fixed effects, we identify a significant high temperature-mortgage default relation. An additonal day of mean temperatures above 90oF (32.2oC) in each month for the last 12 months is associated with a 3.2% and 3.5% increase in the probability of 30-day delinquency and foreclosure, respectively. To explain the effect, tests are specified to differentiate between three plausible channels: behavioural-psychological, income-liquidity, and rational belief updating. Evidence favors the belief updating channel as dominant. All three channels help explain the link between high temperature and 30-day delinquency, but, given the long lags from delinquency to foreclosure and the pronounced costs, belief updating best explains the effects of high temperature on foreclosure outcomes. High temperatures paired with higher rates of default indicate that borrowers mark down their own estimate of house value, perceiving a mismatch between their current home-location and their preferred home-location. Our findings have direct monetary and bank regulatory policy implications.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126221868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Risk and Return of Impact Investing Funds","authors":"Jessica S. Jeffers, Tianshu Lyu, Kelly E. Posenau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3949530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949530","url":null,"abstract":"We provide the first analysis of the risk exposure and consequent risk-adjusted performance of impact investing funds, private market funds with dual financial and social goals. We introduce a new dataset of impact fund cash flows constructed directly from financial statements. When accounting for market risk exposure, impact funds underperform the market by $0.30 on the dollar, but outperform venture capital (VC) funds by $0.15 on the dollar, consistent with the presence of substantial frictions in private markets. Impact funds perform on par with funds matched on size, asset class, and vintage years. We exploit known distortions in measures of VC performance to characterize the risk profile of impact funds. Impact funds have substantially lower market beta than VC funds, contradicting the idea of sustainability as a “luxury good.” Adding additional factors does not change the estimate of performance.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130125735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Felix von Meyerinck, Vesa Pursiainen, Markus Schmid
{"title":"Competition and the Reputational Costs of Litigation","authors":"Felix von Meyerinck, Vesa Pursiainen, Markus Schmid","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3744414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744414","url":null,"abstract":"We study the role of competition in customers' reactions to litigation against firms, using anonymized mobile phone location data. A class action lawsuit filing results in a 4% average reduction in customer visits to target firms' outlets in the following months. The effect strongly depends on competition. Outlets facing more competition experience significantly larger negative effects. Closer competition matters more, both in terms of geographic and industry proximity. Announcement returns and quarterly accounting revenues around lawsuit filings also strongly depend on competition. Our results suggest that competition is an important component in customers' ability to discipline firms for misbehavior.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128245109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Funding Conditions, Transaction Costs and the Performance of Anomalies","authors":"Magnim Farouh, René Garcia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3949547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949547","url":null,"abstract":"Transaction costs have declined over time but they can increase considerably when funding liquidity becomes scarce, investors’ fears spike or other frictions limit arbitrage. We estimate bid-ask spreads of thousands of firms at a daily frequency and put forward these large movements for several of these episodes in the last 30 years. The trading cost of three-quarters of the firms is significantly impacted by funding liquidity and increases on average by 24%. While small firms and high volatility firms have larger transaction costs, the relative increase in trading costs in crisis times is more pronounced in large firms and low-volatility firms. The gap between the respective trading costs of these high- and low-quality groups also increases when financial conditions deteriorate, which provides evidence of flight to quality. We build anomaly-based long-short portfolios and estimate their alphas adjusted for rebalancing costs based on our security-level transaction cost estimates to show that only three anomaly strategies related to unexpected earnings, sales growth and price per share yield a significant positive profit. Strategies reducing the turnover only marginally add to the actual alpha-producing characteristics.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133829679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Salience, Awareness, and the Real Consequence of Information Bundling","authors":"Tian Qiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3949554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949554","url":null,"abstract":"Firms often bundle announcements of corporate events, such as dividend changes and repurchases, together with quarterly earnings news. This paper studies the real consequence of this disclosure practice in the context of the market for corporate control. I find bundled repurchase announcements significantly increase the announcer’s likelihood of becoming a takeover target. Daily Bloomberg news readership data confirms increased awareness is a channel for this effect. Consistent with this channel, targets in bundling-induced takeovers are ex ante less visible. To facilitate causal inference, I use difference-in-differences and instrumental variable estimations to alleviate omitted variables and self-selection concerns.","PeriodicalId":353665,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128028021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}