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Manu Will Unfold The Rubik’s Manifold: 42 Easy Steps To Solving The Cube Manu将展开魔方的歧管:42个简单的步骤来解决魔方
DecisionSciRN: Solution Concepts (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3880841
Manu Kashyap, R. Kashyap
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引用次数: 0
Discovery Process in Normal-Form Games with Unawareness: Cognitive Stability and Closedness under Rational Behavior 具有无意识的范式游戏的发现过程:理性行为下的认知稳定性和封闭性
DecisionSciRN: Solution Concepts (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2021-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3781717
Yoshihiko Tada
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引用次数: 1
Recursive Nash-in-Nash Bargaining Solution 递归Nash-in-Nash议价解
DecisionSciRN: Solution Concepts (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3319517
Xiaowei Yu, K. Waehrer
{"title":"Recursive Nash-in-Nash Bargaining Solution","authors":"Xiaowei Yu, K. Waehrer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3319517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319517","url":null,"abstract":"The standard Nash-in-Nash solution is commonly applied in a number of policy applications. However, this bargaining framework does not capture renegotiation on off-equilibrium paths or contingent contracts and as a result in some situations the predictions of standard Nash-in-Nash are counter-intuitive. Thus, we propose a new bargaining solution for interdependent bilateral negotiations, which we call the recursive Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution. The main difference between this bargaining framework and the standard Nash-in-Nash is in the treatment of the disagreement point, which we assume is the bargaining payoffs given that all other negotiations happen with recognition of this disagreement rather than the equilibrium outcomes. We show that under some assumptions, the recursive Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution is the same as the Shapley value or the more general Myerson value for the corresponding cooperative game. This equivalence allows the recursive Nash-in-Nash solution to be calculated relatively easily for policy applications.","PeriodicalId":347673,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Solution Concepts (Sub-Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126880243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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