{"title":"The Dawn of Language","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Language is a quintessential human capacity. In this chapter, we ask whether the human capacity for language relies on innate knowledge. As a case study, we examine the rules of phonology. This, seems like a curious choice. Most people believe they know how phonology works, and in their naïve theory, phonology requires no knowledge at all. Phonological patterns, people believe, are simply governed by the constraints of their ears, lips, and tongues. But a careful analysis of the anatomy of a syllable suggests this theory might be misinformed. These conclusions receive further support from an unexpected source—the phonology of sign languages. All these results suggest that our capacity for language could well be due to innate knowledge of abstract rules.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126117680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decoding Dyslexia","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Cognitive brain disorders, such as dyslexia, also come in for their fair share of misconceptions, and this is the case among laypeople, policymakers, and even teachers. But oddly, the misconceptions surrounding disorders affecting “cold” cognition are the mirror images of our errors in reasoning about psychiatric disorders that we associate with “warm” emotions. We are all too eager to assume that major depression is innate, controlled by the material brain and out of the patients’ hands; for dyslexia, we incorrectly assume the opposite—that it is “just” “in our mind” (not in our brain and genes). Chapter 13 explains how reading works and what dyslexia really is, and it shows how our misconceptions about it arise from Dualism and Essentialism.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116746287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Know Thyself","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Remy, the Harvard Humanities cat, spends his days amidst Harvard’s academic towers, blissfully oblivious to his intellectual surroundings. It is obvious to us that Remy suffers certain cognitive limitations of which he is entirely unaware. After all, we are humans, whereas Remy was born a cat. That a pet might experience a certain level of cognitive blindness is an idea we accept with equanimity. But we are far less comfortable with the thought that we might suffer from similar cognitive limitations ourselves. Logic, however, compels us to entertain this as a distinct possibility. Having recognized that biology can innately limit other species’ cognitions and that we too are biological kinds, blindness could very well obscure human minds. Fear of blindness goes throughout our intellectual history all the way to the ancient Greeks. In this book, we see that, just as the Greek feared, we are oblivion to our own human nature, and our blindness is in our fate. It emanates from human nature itself.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115958081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nativist Intuitions","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Having shown that innate knowledge is a viable scientific hypothesis with considerable evidence in its support, the next three chapters examine laypeople’s intuitions about innate knowledge. We describe a series of experiments that contrasts people’s intuitions about the origins of cognitive traits (those that capture knowledge) and noncognitive traits (either sensory, motor, or emotive capacities). Results show that people believe that cognitive traits are not innate. People maintain these convictions even when they are provided with detailed descriptions of experiments from infant research (those reviewed in previous chapters), complete with an explanation of the rationale and method; while science clearly suggests these principles are present in newborns, people insist that they aren’t. Other results demonstrate that our antinativist intuitions are a bias, as people maintain these intuitions despite explicit evidence to the contrary, and even when they are presented with innate knowledge of nonhuman species. These results show that people are systematically and selectively biased against innate ideas.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115717762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Perfect Storm","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Having named the storm makers (the twin principles of Dualism and Essentialism) and described their distractive potential, Chapter 8 moves to track the two forces in action in a laboratory setting. The first set of experiments tests the effects of Dualism, showing that people do, in fact, believe that traits that are considered “ideas” must be immaterial. The second examines whether participants believe that immaterial traits cannot be innate, as would be required by Essentialism. Next, we chase the storm itself. As a proof of our forecasting skills, we demonstrate that it is possible to change the storm’s course (people’s intuitions about nativism) by tweaking its ingredients. The antinativist bias can be heightened in a laboratory setting by increasing the perceived distance between mind and body (as in Dualism), and it can be lessened by suggesting that innate biological traits have a material basis in the human body (as in Essentialism). Together, these experiments demonstrate that antinativism is an inevitable byproduct of the clash between these two principles of core knowledge. Having exposed our blindness to what we know, the second part of the book proceeds to explore the implications of this thesis to who we think we are. We consider a vast number of social and personal matters, including our thoughts and feelings, our reasoning about the brain in health and disease, what happens when we die, and our free will.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122230822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Land of the Free","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Having seen how Dualism and Essentialism toy with our understanding of our beginning and end, health and disease, Chapter 15 turns to examine how these colored lenses distort our view of our free will and the self. Whether free will truly exists is not a matter I will decide here, but whether we think it does is entirely within this chapter’s purview. When I believe I have freely chosen to lift my finger, I essentially believe in three things: first, that I can tell whether I did it; second, that I can tell whether I consciously willed the act; and third, that there is a single, unitary, willing ”me.” All three beliefs are demonstrably wrong. Dualism and Essentialism are again to blame.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133739909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Social World","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a very brief overview of the social capacities of young infants. Specifically, we the author ask whether infants instinctively know that (human) agents are distinct from objects. new see that newborn infants spontaneously imitate agents; they follow their gaze, and they selectively respond to human faces, but not objects. A few months later, infants also seem to know that (unlike objects), the behavior of agents is driven by their beliefs and goals, and they spontaneously prefer “good” agents (those that help others) to “bad” ones (those that hinder others from attaining their goals). These results suggest that young infants possess intuitive knowledge of psychology, distinct from their naïve physics.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131314586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innateness Stories","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Innate knowledge—the possibility that certain notions might be inborn in us simply because we are humans—has been the topic of endless controversy throughout our intellectual history. This chapter reviews some of these exchanges in philosophy and in modern cognitive and brain sciences. But these discussions are not the sole purview of academia. Laypeople also have some strong opinions on such matters. This chapter thus begins by describing some of our nativist intuitions. We next contrast these views with science. While laypeople maintain that knowledge cannot be innate, the results emerging from science suggest that innateness is a viable possibility. What is the source of our antinativist intuitions? We explore several explanations, and in short order, the conclusions point back right at innate knowledge itself. We see that the very principles that make the human mind tick (principles that are likely innate) can explain why people are reluctant to accept that knowledge can be innate.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129962654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mental Disorders","authors":"I. Berent","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061920.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"At the “age of the brain,” one would expect the public to view psychiatric disorders as “diseases like all others.” But mental illness still carries a significant social stigma that deprives them of employment, housing, and social opportunities. Invoking the brain as the source of disease helps reduce stigma, but it elicits curious fatalistic reactions. People believe that if the disease is “in the brain,” then it is more severe, incurable, and resistant to psychotherapy. And it is not only the general public that is taken by such misconceptions. Patients believe the same, and so do even trained clinicians. Why do psychiatric disorders elicit such persistent misconceptions? No one would shun a cancer patient because she has a tumor in her breast. Why shun the sufferer of a disorder that ravages the brain? And why believe brain diseases are incurable?\u0000This chapter traces the misconceptions of brain disorders to the core knowledge of Dualism and Essentialism. Dualism prompts us to presume that the mind and matter don’t mix and match; if the disease is “in your brain matter,” then, in our intuitive psychology, ephemeral “talk therapy” won’t do. Essentialism further compels us to believe that what’s “in” our material body is innate, hence, immutable, so biology is truly destiny. Thus, the same core knowledge principles that plague our self-understanding in health also derail our reasoning about psychiatric disease.","PeriodicalId":347225,"journal":{"name":"The Blind Storyteller","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115403859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}