{"title":"НАЛОГИ В ПЕРИОД ПЕРВОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ (1914-1918) (Taxes during the First World War (1914-1918))","authors":"L. Pushkareva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3666822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3666822","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Налогообложение было тем методом финансирования войны, который<br>был наименее предпочтительным для экспертов и политического руководства и который в<br>наименьшей степени способствовал бюджетам России в военное время. Повышение<br>налоговых ставок было деликатным вопросом, учитывая, что низшие классы уже несли<br>непропорционально большую долю налогового бремени на своих плечах: до войны косвенное<br>налогообложение основных продуктов потребления (сахар, табак, спички, спиртные напитки<br>и минеральные масла) составляли четыре пятых от общего объема налоговых поступлений,<br>остальная часть поступала от сборов на недвижимость, капитал, передачу имущества и тому<br>подобное. Правительство, тем не менее, увеличило некоторые из существующих ранее<br>прямых и косвенных налогов, а также повысило пошлины на железные дороги как для<br>пассажиров, так и для перевозки грузов.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> Taxation was the method of financing the war that was least preferred by experts and political leadership and which least contributed to Russia's wartime budgets. Raising tax rates was a sensitive issue, given that the lower classes already carried a disproportionate share of the tax burden on their shoulders: before the war, indirect taxation of basic consumer products (sugar, tobacco, matches, spirits and mineral oils) accounted for four-fifths of total tax revenue, the remainder came from fees on real estate, capital, property transfers and the like. The Government, however, has increased some of the existing direct and indirect taxes, as well as increased rail duties for both passengers and freight.","PeriodicalId":346181,"journal":{"name":"PSN: History of Domestic Politics and Conflict (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117261425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Drafting the Great Army: Optimal Conscription in Napoleonic France","authors":"L. Rouanet, E. Piano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3541407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541407","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to mobilize large armies for the purposes of national defense and territorial expansion is a key feature of the modern state. Post-revolutionary France was among the first European powers to adopt large-scale conscription to man its army. For its conscription efforts to be effective, the French government had to overcome the obstacle posed by desertion. This article develops a framework to study the optimal response to the threat of desertion in designing conscription policies. We argue that geography was a major determinant of the administrative costs of enforcing conscription. Using a novel data-set on conscription and desertion from Napoleonic France, we show that regions with higher terrain ruggedness were more prone to desertion. We also show that, in response to the variation in enforcement costs across regions, the national government adjusted its conscription policies accordingly: More Frenchmen were drafted in regions where the administrative costs of conscription were lower.","PeriodicalId":346181,"journal":{"name":"PSN: History of Domestic Politics and Conflict (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125394428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany","authors":"Andreas Lichter, Max Löffler, Sebastian Siegloch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486145","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the long-run effects of government surveillance on civic capital and economic performance, studying the case of the Stasi in East Germany. Exploiting regional variation in the number of spies and administrative features of the system, we combine a border discontinuity design with an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the long-term, post-reunification effect of government surveillance. We find that a higher spying density led to persistently lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-reunification Germany. We also find substantial and long-lasting economic effects of Stasi surveillance, resulting in lower income, higher exposure to unemployment, and lower self-employment.","PeriodicalId":346181,"journal":{"name":"PSN: History of Domestic Politics and Conflict (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121252550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}