{"title":"Alone Against the Organization—Peer’s Whistleblower Story","authors":"P. Svenkerud","doi":"10.4324/9780367822033-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367822033-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":346175,"journal":{"name":"Whistleblowing, Communication and Consequences","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122580718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Whistleblowing","authors":"B. Bakken, Thorvald Hærem","doi":"10.4324/9780367822033-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367822033-12","url":null,"abstract":"By skipping managers and appealing directly to politicians, whistleblowers can play a critical role in revealing organizational information. However, the protection of whistleblowers can affect managers’ abilities to discipline employees. Politicians must therefore strike a balance between information revelation and the preservation of bureaucrats’ incentives to exert effort. This paper explores these tradeoffs with a model of agency decision-making under incomplete information. In the game, an employee’s effort determines a project’s type, and a manager chooses whether to approve the project and discipline the employee. By whistleblowing, an employee reveals the type to a politician, who may override the manager’s decision. While whistleblowing always increases the transmission of information, its effects on employee effort depend on managerial preferences. A key finding is that stronger whistleblower protections reduce effort when the manager is “aggressive” and would commit more Type I errors than the politician would, but increase effort otherwise. Whistleblower protections therefore unambiguously benefit politicians if an agency is inclined to make Type II errors.","PeriodicalId":346175,"journal":{"name":"Whistleblowing, Communication and Consequences","volume":"189 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117318568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}