{"title":"The Location of Consciousness","authors":"M. Tye","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness*, as I call it in Chapter 4, is everywhere, residing as it does wherever there is a quark or some other fundamental entity. But what about consciousness? Evidently, consciousness requires a brain. If creatures with brains had never evolved, there would have been no such thing as consciousness. But where in the brain is consciousness located? A proposal by Crick and Koch is considered, as is one by Damasio. It is shown that a puzzle arises for both of their proposals and a reconciliation offered. The further question of which brains support consciousness is also addressed. It is argued that honeybees and fruit flies are conscious but leeches and box jellyfish are not.","PeriodicalId":345582,"journal":{"name":"Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126754923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Paradox of Consciousness","authors":"M. Tye","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"There are strong reasons to hold that phenomenal consciousness (experience) cannot be sharp (on/off) and equally strong reasons to hold that phenomenal consciousness cannot be vague (admitting borderline cases). In the former case, the reasons have to do with understanding the emergence of consciousness in the physical world. In the latter case, the reasons have to do with the fact that when we try to describe a borderline case of consciousness, we always end up describing a case in which there is indeterminacy in what is experienced as opposed to in experience or consciousness itself. A paradox thus arises in our thinking about consciousness. This chapter is devoted to laying out the paradox in detail.","PeriodicalId":345582,"journal":{"name":"Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131903528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russellian Monism to the Rescue?","authors":"M. Tye","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter elaborates two standard versions of a view of consciousness known as Russellian Monism. The key idea of this view is that the fundamental entities in micro-reality have intrinsic natures not specified in microphysics, natures that include a range of properties crucial to consciousness and conscious states. The reductive version holds that the relevant properties are themselves genuinely conscious properties of various sorts. The primitivist version holds that the relevant properties ground macro-level conscious properties without themselves involving consciousness. It is shown that neither version is defensible and that neither helps with the paradox.","PeriodicalId":345582,"journal":{"name":"Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129113825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Representationalism and Panpsychism","authors":"M. Tye","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"A solution is offered to the paradox presented in Chapter 1. This solution requires us to embrace a qualified form of panpsychism for consciousness, or rather for a key element of consciousness I call “consciousness*”. Consciousness, I claim, is inherently representational and did indeed evolve. This is not true for consciousness*. Three problems are discussed for the hybrid view I develop: the problem of undirected consciousness; the problem of combination; and the problem of tiny psychological subjects. Solutions are offered for each of these problems. The final section of the chapter takes up the question of the causal efficacy of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":345582,"journal":{"name":"Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness","volume":"7 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130503667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transparency and Representationalism","authors":"M. Tye","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the phenomenon of transparency and presents several different versions of representationalism about conscious states, only one of which is endorsed. There are discussions of representationalism with respect to perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, emotions, conscious thoughts, and moods. Along the way, the objection from blur in vision is addressed and an account offered of how introspection works with respect to conscious states. At the end, there is a discussion of whether consciousness itself is transparent to us. The background context for this discussion is provided by some remarks made by G.E. Moore that seem to run counter to transparency.","PeriodicalId":345582,"journal":{"name":"Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127133751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}