Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy最新文献

Short Paper: Device- and Locality-Specific Fingerprinting of Shared NISQ Quantum Computers 短论文:共享NISQ量子计算机的设备和位置特定指纹

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505261

Mi Allen, Deng Shuwen, Szefer Jakub

引用次数: 6

InTrust-IoT: Intelligent Ecosystem based on Power Profiling of Trusted device(s) in IoT for Hardware Trojan Detection trust -IoT:基于物联网中可信设备功率分析的智能生态系统，用于硬件木马检测

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505262

Hawzhin Mohammed, Faiq Khalid, P. Sawyer, Gabriella V. Cataloni, S. R. Hasan

{"title":"InTrust-IoT: Intelligent Ecosystem based on Power Profiling of Trusted device(s) in IoT for Hardware Trojan Detection","authors":"Hawzhin Mohammed, Faiq Khalid, P. Sawyer, Gabriella V. Cataloni, S. R. Hasan","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505262","url":null,"abstract":"Modern Resource-Constrained (RC) Internet of Things (IoT) devices are subject to several types of attacks, including hardware-level attacks. Most of the existing state-of-the-art solutions are invasive, require expensive design time interventions, or need dataset generation from non-trusted RC-IoT devices or both. We argue that the health of modern RC-IoT devices requires a final line of defense against possible hardware attacks that go undetected during the IC design and test process. Hence, in this paper, we propose a defense methodology against non-zero-day and zero-day attacks, leveraging machine learning techniques trained on the dataset obtained without design time intervention and using ‘only’ trusted IoT devices. In the process, a complete eco-system is developed where data is generated through a trusted group of devices, and machine learning is done on these trusted datasets. Next, this trusted trained model is deployed in regular IoT systems that contain untrusted devices, where the attack on untrusted devices can be detected in real-time. Our results indicate that for non-zero-day attacks, the proposed technique can concurrently detect DoS and power depletion attacks with an accuracy of about 80%. Similarly, zero-day attack experiments are able to detect the attack without fail as well.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122859940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

SPARSE: Spatially Aware LFI Resilient State Machine Encoding 稀疏:空间感知LFI弹性状态机编码

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505254

Muhtadi Choudhury, Shahin Tajik, Domenic Forte

引用次数: 5

Lessons Learned from Blockchain Applications of Trusted Execution Environments and Implications for Future Research 可信执行环境的区块链应用的经验教训及其对未来研究的影响

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505259

Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Lin Chen, Fengwei Zhang, Zhimin Gao, W. Shi

{"title":"Lessons Learned from Blockchain Applications of Trusted Execution Environments and Implications for Future Research","authors":"Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Lin Chen, Fengwei Zhang, Zhimin Gao, W. Shi","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505259","url":null,"abstract":"Modern computer systems tend to rely on large trusted computing bases (TCBs) for operations. To address the TCB bloating problem, hardware vendors have developed mechanisms to enable or facilitate the creation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which critical software applications can execute securely in an isolated environment. Even under the circumstance that a host OS is compromised by an adversary, key security properties such as confidentiality and integrity of the software inside the TEEs can be guaranteed. The promise of integrity and security has driven developers to adopt it for use cases involving access control, PKS, IoT among other things. Among these applications include blockchain-related use cases. The usage of the TEEs doesn’t come without its own implementation challenges and potential pitfalls. In this paper, we examine the assumptions, security models, and operational environments of the proposed TEE use cases of blockchain-based applications. The exercise and analysis help the hardware TEE research community to identify some open challenges and opportunities for research and rethink the design of hardware TEEs in general.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114850480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Short Paper: A Quantum Circuit Obfuscation Methodology for Security and Privacy 一种用于安全和隐私的量子电路混淆方法

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505260

A. Suresh, Abdullah Ash-Saki, Mahababul Alam, R. Topaloglu, Swaroop Ghosh

{"title":"Short Paper: A Quantum Circuit Obfuscation Methodology for Security and Privacy","authors":"A. Suresh, Abdullah Ash-Saki, Mahababul Alam, R. Topaloglu, Swaroop Ghosh","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505260","url":null,"abstract":"In the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) realm, efficient quantum circuit compilation is critical to ensure successful computation. Several third-party compilers are improving the compilation times and depth/gate counts. Untrusted third parties or a particular version of a trusted compiler may allow an attacker to steal, clone, and/or reverse engineer the quantum circuit. We propose to obfuscate quantum circuits by employing dummy CNOT gates to prevent such threats. If the adversary clones the obfuscated design, he/she will get faulty results. We propose a metric-based dummy gate insertion process to ensure maximum corruption of functionality measured using Total Variation Distance (TVD) and validated using IBM’s noisy simulators. Our metric guided dummy gate insertion process achieves TVD of up to 28.83%, and performs 10.14% better than the average TVD and performs within 12.45% of the best obtainable TVD for the test benchmarks. The removal of dummy gates by the designer post-compilation to restore functionality as well as other finer details have been addressed.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122539444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

A Novel Memory Management for RISC-V Enclaves 一种新的RISC-V封装内存管理方法

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505257

Hao Li, Weijie Huang, Mingde Ren, Hongyi Lu, Zhenyu Ning, Heming Cui, Fengwei Zhang

引用次数: 1

Towards Trusted IoT Sensing Systems: Implementing PUF as Secure Key Generator for Root of Trust and Message Authentication Code 迈向可信的物联网传感系统:实现PUF作为信任根和消息认证码的安全密钥生成器

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505258

Kota Yoshida, K. Suzaki, T. Fujino

{"title":"Towards Trusted IoT Sensing Systems: Implementing PUF as Secure Key Generator for Root of Trust and Message Authentication Code","authors":"Kota Yoshida, K. Suzaki, T. Fujino","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505258","url":null,"abstract":"Trustworthy sensor data is important for IoT sensing systems. As such, these systems need to guarantee that the sensor data is acquired by the correct device and has not been tampered with. However, IoT sensing systems can be quite complex and are often composed of multiple components, i.e., a main device and subordinate sensors. The main device is responsible for gathering and processing the data from the subordinate sensor and reports the result to a server. In order to guarantee data correctness, we introduce two types of physically unclonable function (PUF): one for the main device and one for the subordinate sensor. The main device has a trusted execution environment (TEE) for critical processing, and the correctness of the TEE is guaranteed by remote attestation based on a PUF. The subordinate sensor sends the sensor data to the main device with a message authentication code (MAC) based on a PUF. We implemented a trusted IoT sensing system using a RISC-V Keystone with a PRINCE Glitch PUF for the main device and a Raspberry Pi that simulates a CMOS image sensor PUF for the subordinate sensor.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114568606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Practical and Scalable Security Verification of Secure Architectures 安全体系结构的实用和可扩展的安全验证

Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2018-07-05 DOI: 10.1145/3505253.3505256

Jakub Szefer, Tianwei Zhang, R. Lee

引用次数: 1