{"title":"Necessity","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 5 develops and defends an original account of the necessity constraint on the use of defensive force. The chapter argues that the necessity condition is grounded in the right to be rescued from harm when this rescue can be provided at reasonable cost. The chapter argues that even wrongful attackers have the right to be rescued from serious harm when others can do so at reasonable cost, and this right explains why there is a necessity condition on the permissible use of defensive force. The chapter also offers criticisms of competing conceptions of the necessity condition, as well as offering a particular view regarding the relationship between necessity and liability.","PeriodicalId":338365,"journal":{"name":"The Morality of Defensive Force","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115692859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proportionality","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 develops and defends an original conception of proportionality in defensive force: the stringency principle. On this view, the degree of force to which a wrongful attacker renders himself liable is determined by the stringency of the right that the attacker threatens to violate. The more stringent the right that is threatened, the greater the degree of force to which the wrongful attacker is liable. The chapter also provides a critique of an influential alternative view, one that makes an attacker’s degree of liability depend, in part, on the attacker’s degree of moral responsibility for posing a wrongful threat.","PeriodicalId":338365,"journal":{"name":"The Morality of Defensive Force","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125350899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liability","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 develops and defends an original account of liability to defensive harm: the moral status account. On this view, a person renders himself liable to defensive harm when the evidence-relative permissibility of his act depends on the assumption that others lack certain moral rights that they in fact possess, and his act threatens, or reasonably appears to threaten, those rights. The chapter also provides criticisms of competing accounts of liability, in particular, the moral responsibility account influentially developed by Jeff McMahan, among others. The chapter concludes by addressing a number of objections that might be pressed against the moral status account.","PeriodicalId":338365,"journal":{"name":"The Morality of Defensive Force","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133759320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Means Principle","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 7 develops and defends a novel conception of the means principle. The chapter argues that there is an absolute prohibition on the harmful use of another person’s body or other rightful property, unless the person who is harmed is duty bound to permit this use, or has otherwise waived their claims against such use. He argues that this principle does not focus on an agent’s intentions, but rather only on whether achieving the outcome that ostensibly justifies an agent’s act requires the use of another person’s body or rightful property. The chapter argues that this conception of the means principle is superior to competing principles in the literature, and it outlines some of the implications for the morality of defensive force.","PeriodicalId":338365,"journal":{"name":"The Morality of Defensive Force","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127797563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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