Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security最新文献

Talking About My Generation: Targeted DOM-based XSS Exploit Generation using Dynamic Data Flow Analysis 谈论我们这一代人:使用动态数据流分析生成基于dom的XSS漏洞

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458718

Souphiane Bensalim, David Klein, Thomas Barber, Martin Johns

引用次数: 9

Fine-grained Program Partitioning for Security 细粒度的安全程序分区

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458717

Zhen Huang, T. Jaeger, Gang Tan

引用次数: 5

SGXoMeter: Open and Modular Benchmarking for Intel SGX SGXoMeter:英特尔SGX的开放和模块化基准测试

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458722

Mohammad Mahhouk, Nico Weichbrodt, R. Kapitza

{"title":"SGXoMeter: Open and Modular Benchmarking for Intel SGX","authors":"Mohammad Mahhouk, Nico Weichbrodt, R. Kapitza","doi":"10.1145/3447852.3458722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3447852.3458722","url":null,"abstract":"Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are currently the most wide-spread commodity trusted execution environment, which provides integrity and confidentiality of sensitive code and data. Thereby, it offers protection even against privileged attackers and various forms of physical attacks. As a technology that only became available in late 2015, it has received massive interest and undergone a rapid evolution. Despite first ad-hoc attempts, there is so far no standardised approach to benchmark the SGX hardware, its associated environment, and techniques that were designed to harden SGX-based applications. In this paper, we present SGXoMeter, an open and modular framework designed to benchmark different SGX-aware CPUs, &mgr;code revisions, SDK versions and extensions to mitigate side-channel attacks. SGXoMeter provides a set of practical SGX test case scenarios and eases the development of custom benchmarks. Furthermore, we compare it to sgx-nbench, the only other SGX application benchmark tool we are aware of, and evaluate their differences. Through our benchmark results, we identified a performance overhead of up to ã10 times induced between two different SGX-SDK versions for certain workload scenarios.","PeriodicalId":329372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133656506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

The Price of Meltdown and Spectre: Energy Overhead of Mitigations at Operating System Level 熔毁和幽灵的代价:操作系统级别缓解的能量开销

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458721

Benedict Herzog, S. Reif, Julian Preis, Wolfgang Schröder-Preikschat, Timo Hönig

引用次数: 6

Reproducing Spectre Attack with gem5: How To Do It Right? 用gem5复制幽灵攻击:如何做到正确?

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458715

Pierre Ayoub, Clémentine Maurice

引用次数: 3

dMVX: Secure and Efficient Multi-Variant Execution in a Distributed Setting dMVX:分布式环境下安全高效的多变量执行

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 2020-11-04 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458714

Alexios Voulimeneas, Dokyung Song, Per Larsen, M. Franz, Stijn Volckaert

{"title":"dMVX: Secure and Efficient Multi-Variant Execution in a Distributed Setting","authors":"Alexios Voulimeneas, Dokyung Song, Per Larsen, M. Franz, Stijn Volckaert","doi":"10.1145/3447852.3458714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3447852.3458714","url":null,"abstract":"Multi-variant execution (MVX) systems amplify the effectiveness of software diversity techniques. The key idea is to run multiple diversified program variants in lockstep while providing them with the same input and monitoring their run-time behavior for divergences. Thus, adversaries have to compromise all program variants simultaneously to mount an attack successfully. Recent work proposed distributed, heterogeneous MVX systems that leverage different ABIs and ISAs to increase the diversity between program variants further. However, existing distributed MVX system designs suffer from high performance overhead due to time-consuming network transactions required for the MVX operations. This paper presents dMVX, a novel hybrid distributed MVX design, which incorporates new techniques that significantly reduce the overhead of MVX systems in a distributed setting. Our key insight is that we can intelligently reduce the MVX operations that use expensive network transfers. First, we can limit the monitoring of system calls that are not security-critical. Second, we observe that, in many circumstances, we can also safely avoid replication operations needed for I/O related system calls. Our evaluation shows that dMVX reduces the performance degradation from over 50% to 3.1% for realistic server benchmarks.","PeriodicalId":329372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117164152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

CollabFuzz CollabFuzz

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458720

Sebastian Österlund, Elia Geretto, Andrea Jemmett, Emre Güler, Philipp Görz, Thorsten Holz, Cristiano Giuffrida, H. Bos

引用次数: 13

TagVet

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458719

Lukas Pirch, Alexander Warnecke, Christian Wressnegger, Konrad Rieck

引用次数: 4

SGXPecial

Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1145/3447852.3458716

Shachee Mishra, M. Polychronakis

{"title":"SGXPecial","authors":"Shachee Mishra, M. Polychronakis","doi":"10.1145/3447852.3458716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3447852.3458716","url":null,"abstract":"Intel SGX is a hardware-based trusted execution technology that partitions an application into trusted and untrusted parts. The trusted part, known as an enclave, executes within an encrypted memory environment, preventing the host application and the OS from being able to access its memory. The enclave, however, has the ability to access the host's memory. When considering malicious code running in an enclave, the strong memory isolation and encryption properties offered may aid the stealthiness of malware, since malware detection tools cannot inspect the enclave. The enclave and the host communicate over bi-directional interfaces that the Intel SGX SDK generates. In this work, we present SGXPecial, a best-effort interface specialization tool that statically analyzes both the host and the enclave to generate interfaces tailored only to their needs. SGXPecial is implemented as an extension to the Edger8r tool of the SGX SDK, and performs API specialization at build time. In particular, SGXPecial performs function, argument, and type-based specialization to restrict the valid control flows across the host-to-enclave boundary. We evaluate SGXPecial's security impact by testing it on SGX SDK sample applications and four open-source SGX applications. SGXPecial effectively prevents five proof-of-concept code reuse attacks in all tested applications.","PeriodicalId":329372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 14th European Workshop on Systems Security","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114811748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7