S. Bhattacharya, D. Tsomocos, C. Goodhart, Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
{"title":"Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle","authors":"S. Bhattacharya, D. Tsomocos, C. Goodhart, Alexandros P. Vardoulakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1773946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773946","url":null,"abstract":"Busts after periods of prolonged prosperity have been found to be catastrophic. Financial institutions increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that were previously considered too risky. This results from institutions rationally updating their expectations and becoming more optimistic about the future prospects of the economy. Default is inevitably harsher when a bad shock occurs after periods of good news. Commonly used measures to forecast risk in the system, such as VIX, fail to capture this phenomenon, as they are also biased by optimistic expectations. Competition among financial institutions for better relative performance exacerbates the boom-bust cycle. We explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility, and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare.","PeriodicalId":328586,"journal":{"name":"2011 Systemic Risk","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122259459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Network Model for Bank Lending Capacity","authors":"C. Schmaltz, S. Pokutta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1773964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773964","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a structural framework to study the impact of a macroeconomic shock on the banking sector’s lending capacity. Our model consists of three building blocks: first, the evolution of non-bank assets that provide the entrance point for shocks from the real economy into the banking sector. Second, a network model that describes the propagation of the shock. Third, regulatory capital constraints that restrict banks’ lending behaviour. Therefore, the framework combines the literature on systemic risk and the literature on the bank lending channel. The building blocks ensure that our model captures six important aspects: firstly, by measuring systemic risk as the reduction in lending capacity, it aligns the model definition of systemic risk to the definition of the European Systemic Risk Board. Secondly, it models banks’ lending behavior as a function of counterparty risk addressing the usual critique of missing microfoundations of bank behavior. Thirdly, it emphasizes that not only defaulted banks, but also distressed banks are a thread for the real economy due to reduced lending capacity. Fourthly, our model shows the procyclicality of current (static) capital requirements. Fifthly, it allows us to study the effects of micro-prudential capital requirements in a network setting. And finally, the model describes the feedback loop of a shock that stems from the real economy through the banking sector back into the real economy.","PeriodicalId":328586,"journal":{"name":"2011 Systemic Risk","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130175084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. López-Espinosa, Antonio Moreno, Antonio Rubia Serrano, Laura Valderrama
{"title":"Asymmetric Covar: An Application to International Banking","authors":"G. López-Espinosa, Antonio Moreno, Antonio Rubia Serrano, Laura Valderrama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1773902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773902","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we measure the systemic risk in a set of large international banks. We first measure the contribution of a financial institution to international systemic risk. Importantly, we show the existence of an asymmetric non-linear contribution of banks to systemic risk depending on whether they experience negative or positive returns. In particular, we show that the more systemic a bank is, the more asymmetry it exhibits. Using the CoVaR methodology recently proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), we show that the short-term debt to assets ratio (liquidity risk) is a key factor behind systemic risk. We find no evidence that a higher bank size increases systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":328586,"journal":{"name":"2011 Systemic Risk","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115278065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Allen, A. Kramadibrata, R. Powell, Abhay Kumar-Singh
{"title":"Xtreme Credit Risk Models: Implications for Bank Capital Buffers","authors":"D. Allen, A. Kramadibrata, R. Powell, Abhay Kumar-Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1773363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773363","url":null,"abstract":"The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) highlighted the importance of measuring and understanding extreme credit risk. This paper applies Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) techniques, traditionally used in the insurance industry to measure risk beyond a predetermined threshold, to four credit models. For each of the models we use both Historical and Monte Carlo Simulation methodology to create CVaR measurements. The four extreme models are derived from modifications to the Merton structural model (which we term Xtreme-S), the CreditMetrics Transition model (Xtreme-T), Quantile regression (Xtreme-Q), and the author’s own unique iTransition model (Xtreme-i) which incorporates industry factors into transition matrices. For all models, CVaR is found to be significantly higher than VaR, and there are also found to be significant differences between the models in terms of correlation with actual bank losses and CDS spreads. The paper also shows how extreme measures can be used by banks to determine capital buffer requirements.","PeriodicalId":328586,"journal":{"name":"2011 Systemic Risk","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116864659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}