{"title":"Mutual Fund Risk and Market Share Adjusted Fund Flows","authors":"M. Spiegel, H. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1680565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680565","url":null,"abstract":"Several papers use a fractional specification (net inflow/ assets under management) to infer a convex relation between flow and past performance. However, heterogeneous linear response functions combined with the pooled analysis commonly used in these studies can yield false convexity estimates. We show that such heterogeneity obtains in practice. Along these same lines, the paper also finds that several previously unexamined implications of a convex flow-performance relation fail to hold. Moreover, convexity with fractional flows (which we confirm) largely disappears in a conditional analysis that controls for heterogeneity. Market shares offer an alternative specification for flow that is more resilient to heterogeneity. Using this alternative specification, we again find no evidence of convexity in the flow-performance relation. We conclude that the widely held belief that the flow response function is convex is due solely to misspecification of the empirical model. The flow-return relation is linear.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130418584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Portfolio Performance Manipulation and Manipulation-Proof Performance Measures","authors":"W. Goetzmann, J. Ingersoll, M. Spiegel, I. Welch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.302815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302815","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous measures have been proposed to gauge the performance of active management. Unfortunately, these measures can be gamed. Our article shows that gaming can have a substantial impact on popular measures even in the presence of high transactions costs. Our article shows there are conditions under which a manipulation-proof measure exists and fully characterizes it. This measure looks like the average of a power utility function, calculated over the return history. The case for using our alternative ranking metric is particularly compelling for hedge funds whose use of derivatives is unconstrained and whose managers' compensation itself induces a nonlinear payoff.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"550 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123378541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance","authors":"R. Romano","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.596101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.596101","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an evaluation of the substantive corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that is informed by the relevant empirical accounting and finance literature and the political dynamics that produced the mandates. The empirical literature provides a metric for evaluating the mandates' effectiveness, by facilitating identification of whether specific provisions can be most accurately characterized as efficacious reforms or as quack corporate governance. The learning of the literature, which was available when Congress was legislating, is that SOX's corporate governance provisions were ill-conceived. The political environment explains why Congress would enact legislation with such mismatched means and ends. SOX was enacted as emergency legislation amidst a free-falling stock market and media frenzy over corporate scandals shortly before the midterm congressional elections. The governance provisions, included toward the end of the legislative process in the Senate, were not a focus of any considered attention. Their inclusion stemmed from the interaction between election year politics and the Senate banking committee chairman's response to suggestions of policy entrepreneurs. The scholarly literature at odds with those individuals' recommendations was ignored, while the interest groups whose position was more consistent with the literature - the business community and accounting profession - had lost their credibility and become politically radioactive. The paper's conclusion is that SOX's corporate governance provisions should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional. Other nations, such as the members of the European Union who have been revising their corporation codes, would be well advised to avoid Congress' policy blunder.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"3509 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127512414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Simple Decentralized Institution for Learning Competitive Equilibrium","authors":"S. Sunder, Sean Crockett, Stephen E. Spear","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.354124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354124","url":null,"abstract":"The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents' welfare-enhancing opportunity sets generates Pareto optimal allocations in a pure exchange economy. We permit agents to know if they are subsidizing others at such allocations, and to veto such allocations, restricting the subsequent iterations of the algorithm only to those trades that are both Pareto-improving and provide strictly greater wealth, and ultimately utility, for such agents. In this simple institution actions of minimally intelligent agents based on local information can lead the market to approximate competitive equilibrium in a larger set of economies than the tatonnement process would allow. This helps address one of the major shortcomings of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model with respect to the instability of tatonnement in an open set of economies. It also addresses the behavioral critique of mathematically derived equilibria for the inability of cognitively-limited humans to maximize. The proof of convergence of the algorithm presented here also provides a way of showing the existence of competitive equilibrium for monotonic, convex exchange economies with heterogeneous agents and many goods without application of a fixed-point theorem.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114295902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Model for Pricing Stocks and Bonds with Default Risk","authors":"Harry Mamaysky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.310423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310423","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a tractable, dynamic, no-arbitrage model for the pricing of bonds and stocks that are subject to default risk. The model produces the bond pricing equations of the Duffie and Singleton (1999) framework. It is then shown that a particular choice of dividend process, characterized by affine dividend yields, along with the Duffie and Singleton (1999) default specification, produces stock prices that are exponential affine in the model's state variables. Importantly, the model allows for quite general interdependence between the prices of risky debt and equity.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129028768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global Real Estate Markets: Cycles and Fundamentals","authors":"B. Case, W. Goetzmann, K. Rouwenhorst","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.157019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.157019","url":null,"abstract":"The correlations among international real estate markets are surprisingly high, given the degree to which they are segmented. While industrial, office and retail properties exist all around the world, they are not economic substitutes because of locational specificity. In addition, the broad securitization of real estate property companies has, until recently, lagged that of other types of companies. Never-the-less, international property returns move together in dramatic fashion. In this paper, we use eleven years of global property returns to explore the factors influencing this co-movement. We attribute a substantial amount of the correlation across world property markets to the effects of changes in GNP, suggesting that real estate is a bet on fundamental economic variables which are correlated across countries. A decomposition shows that a local production factor is more important in some countries than in others.","PeriodicalId":326836,"journal":{"name":"Yale SOM: Finance including ICF Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121259750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}