{"title":"Match Length Realization and Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Games","authors":"F. Mengel, Ludovica Orlandi, Simon Weidenholzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3777155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3777155","url":null,"abstract":"Experimental studies of infinitely repeated games typically consist of several indefinitely repeated games (\"matches'') played in sequence with different partners each time, whereby match length, i.e. the number of stages of each game is randomly determined. Using a large meta data set on indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Dal Bo & Frechette, 2018) we demonstrate that the realized length of early matches has a substantial impact on cooperation rates in subsequent matches. We estimate simple learning models displaying the \"power law of practice'' and show that participants do learn from match length realization. We then study three cases from the literature where realized match length has a strong impact on treatment comparisons, both in terms of the size and the direction of the treatment effect. These results have important implications for our understanding of how people learn in infinitely repeated games as well as for experimental design.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117072299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking Turns in Continuous Time","authors":"Shuchen Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3706421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3706421","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of continuous time interactions on the dynamics of battle of the sexes games with laboratory experiments. In discrete time battle of the sexes games, players often interact with alternating strategies and switch between two pure Nash equilibria, which is difficult to coordinate in continuous time because the players must determine both the order of alternations and how long to remain at each pure equilibrium. Overall, laboratory subjects behave differently in the two time environments. Although the continuous time interactions accelerate the initial convergence to one of the pure strategy equilibria and divergence from mismatches, they undermine the subjects' subsequent ability to coordinate moves from one equilibrium to the other. Compared to the alternating pattern in discrete time, the pattern in continuous time is unstable and diverse, and the transitions are mainly motivated by the disadvantaged subjects. The difficulty in alternation also slows the learning process in continuous time.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115746129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cooperation in Indefinite Games: Evidence from Red Queen Games","authors":"Andrew Smyth, Cortney S. Rodet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3619238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3619238","url":null,"abstract":"We test whether the length of an indefinite horizon, or that the horizon is indefinite as opposed to finite, affects cooperation in repeated 3x3 Red Queen Games. With our participant population, and our experimental program and procedures, the length of the indefinite horizon significantly affects cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. However, it does not significantly affect cooperation in the Red Queen Game. Nor does the indefiniteness of the horizon significantly affect cooperation in this latter game. Our results highlight the importance of learning in indefinite games with even slightly larger strategy spaces than the Prisoner's Dilemma.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127021206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coordination Games in Continuous Time","authors":"Shuchen Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3470747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3470747","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of continuous time interaction on two iconic coordination games: stag hunt and battle of the sexes in a laboratory environment and compare results to possible theoretical explanations. Experimental results show that subjects consistently coordinate better in continuous time than in discrete time under various treatment environments. In continuous time, they are also more likely to converge to payoff-dominant equilibrium in stag hunt games and alternating dynamics in battle of the sexes games. Furthermore, the coordination rate is affected by complexity of action sets and weakly influenced by payoff matrices. The paper also explores some stylized facts that result in the treatment effects.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125586612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stable Sampling in Repeated Games","authors":"Rajiv Sethi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468993","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper considers finitely repeated games played by procedurally rational players, who sample their available alternatives and use realized payoffs as a basis for strategy selection. The corresponding solution concept is that of (payoff) sampling equilibrium, which is a distribution over strategies that is self-replicating under the sampling procedure. Sampling equilibria are rest points of a disequilibrium dynamic process, and stability with respect to this process can be used as an equilibrium selection criterion. The structure of stable sampling equilibria in symmetric, finitely repeated games is characterized, and illustrated with applications to cooperation and coordination over time.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123570826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial Transfers and Climate Cooperation","authors":"Suzi Kerr, S. Lippert, Edmund Y. Lou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477054","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of side-payments to countries that have a low net benefit from participating in efficient climate cooperation in a repeated games framework with investment in different technologies. We consider different timings of these payments and different degrees of commitment. If countries cannot commit ex ante to transfer funds to low-benefit participants to an agreement, then there is a trade-off. Investment based agreements, where transfers occur before emissions are realized, but after investments have been committed, maximize the scope of cooperation. Results-based agreements minimize transfers whenever these agreements implement cooperation. If countries can commit to transfer funds, then agreements in which countries with high benefits of climate cooperation pre-commit to results-based payments to countries with low benefits both maximize the scope of cooperation and minimize transfers.","PeriodicalId":321107,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Strategic & Extensive Form Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125929931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}