FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic)最新文献

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Appraisal Risk and Corporate Disclosure During Mergers and Acquisitions 并购中的评估风险与公司信息披露
FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3799216
C. Stewart
{"title":"Appraisal Risk and Corporate Disclosure During Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"C. Stewart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3799216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3799216","url":null,"abstract":"I exploit a 2007 court ruling that significantly strengthens appraisal rights for shareholders of Delaware-incorporated target firms to examine how managers respond to appraisal risk during takeovers. Appraisal rights give target shareholders the right to receive a judge’s determined value for their shares in lieu of the acquirer’s offer. Target-firm disclosures play a critical role in the valuation decisions of judges; and valuation decisions pose a substantial risk to acquirers. I find that heightened appraisal risk induces target managers to withhold positive news arriving between the announcement and effective completion of the takeover. This observation is driven by target managers who are aligned with acquirers. I further document that acquirers benefit from this behavior in the form of a lower likelihood of appraisal and a higher likelihood of positive post-acquisition returns. Overall, my findings suggest that acquirer-target manager ties play an important role in facilitating the dilution of target shareholder property rights.","PeriodicalId":320395,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121076317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation on Disclosure Enforcement and Earnings Attributes 跨国合作对信息披露执法和收益属性的影响
FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-05-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3598367
R. Silvers
{"title":"The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation on Disclosure Enforcement and Earnings Attributes","authors":"R. Silvers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3598367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598367","url":null,"abstract":"This study tests for changes in U.S.-listed foreign firms’ financial reporting properties and transparency when their home market regulators enter an arrangement that facilitates enforcement cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This arrangement—the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU)—has explicit disclosure-related provisions. I show that the MMoU is associated with improvements across various measures of accounting properties and transparency. Collectively, the findings help resolve enduring questions about why the earnings quality of U.S.-listed foreign firms diverged from that of U.S. firms during pre-MMoU periods.","PeriodicalId":320395,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":"236 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116293411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Endogenous Political Institutions and Financial Development 内生政治制度与金融发展
FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3011974
T. Lambert, P. Volpin
{"title":"Endogenous Political Institutions and Financial Development","authors":"T. Lambert, P. Volpin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3011974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011974","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter surveys the literature on the political economy of finance. This field offers three main insights. First, it highlights the importance of the role of political institutions in financial development. Second, it shows how the distribution of political power in society drives the prevailing set of contracting institutions and affects capital allocation and access to finance in developed and developing economies. Third, it argues that recognizing the endogenous nature of political institutions is crucial for our understanding of the evolution and functioning of financial systems.","PeriodicalId":320395,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115964245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
‘Princelings’: Exploring a Special Type of Political Connection in Chinese Listed Firms “太子党”:中国上市公司中一种特殊的政治关系
FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2991349
Xiaoqi Chen, Jianguo Chen, Carolyn G. Wirth
{"title":"‘Princelings’: Exploring a Special Type of Political Connection in Chinese Listed Firms","authors":"Xiaoqi Chen, Jianguo Chen, Carolyn G. Wirth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2991349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2991349","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we identify a new type of political connection, referred to as “princelings,” who are the descendants of prominent and influential senior communist officials in the People’s Republic of China. We develop a theory of “Golden hens versus Chickens” to describe the major features of these connected firms. Consistent with the theory, compared to unconnected firms, “princelings” connected firms (PCFs) stockpile disproportionately larger retained earnings but pay lower cash dividends. We find that such behaviour is not due to either investment or precautionary motives. By examining the components of retained earnings, we identify a discrepancy in the accounting for changes in retained earnings, newly defined as “grey usage,” which potentially represents a newly identified means of tunnelling. Relative to matching firms, PCFs have higher average grey usages on retained earnings by CNY 4.68 million. The findings highlight for investors in PCFs the potential increased risk of expropriation through grey usages.","PeriodicalId":320395,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Property Rights & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127089564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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