{"title":"Corporate Payout Policy and Credit Risk: Evidence from CDS Markets","authors":"Chengzhu Sun, Shujing Wang, Chu Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3036488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3036488","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether and how payout policy affects credit risk using evidence from the credit default swap (CDS) market. CDS spreads increase substantially in response to announcements of dividend cuts, especially during recessions and among firms experiencing financial distress. CDS spreads also react more strongly to permanent and less anticipated dividend cuts. The size of CDS reaction is more pronounced for financial firms, which are inherently more opaque. In contrast, CDS spreads react weakly to dividend raises and share repurchases. The results show that the information effect of dividend changes dominates the wealth transfer effect.","PeriodicalId":319767,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance Empirical","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116629732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Capital Requirements on Small Business Loans Flawed?","authors":"D. Bams, M. Pisa, Christian C. P. Wolff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2702377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2702377","url":null,"abstract":"We explore an inconsistency in the Basel Committee’s Internal Ratings Based (IRB) rules: the capital charges on corporate loans were calibrated to loan-level data, while the capital charges on small business loans were calibrated to fit the capital that a few international banks held prior to this regulation.We argue that the IRB capital charges do not put small business and corporate loans on a level playing field. While downturn risk of corporate loans is accurately captured by the IRB formulas, we show that small businesses have low downturn risk and require 3.5 times lower capital charges than those prescribed by the Basel Committee.","PeriodicalId":319767,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance Empirical","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123379510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shareholder Litigation and Insider Trading: Evidence from Derivative Litigation","authors":"S. Jung, J. Nam, Susan Shu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3109369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3109369","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether shareholder litigation deters informed insider trading, utilizing the staggered adoptions of Universal Demand (UD) laws by different states. The UD laws substantially raise the hurdle for shareholders to file derivative litigation. We find that corporate insiders significantly increase opportunistic trades, including both insider purchases and sales, after the passage of UD laws, suggesting derivative litigation serves a disciplinary role in curbing insider trading. The deterrence effect of derivative litigation complements that of federal securities litigation, as it is effective in constraining informed insider trading activities unaccompanied by investor losses such as insider purchases. The deterrence effect on insider trading is more pronounced for firms with limited media coverage and firms with block-holders who have the resources and incentives to initiate shareholder litigation. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholder litigation in the form of derivative litigation plays a unique governance role.","PeriodicalId":319767,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance Empirical","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116597169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Horizontal Merger Operating Efficiencies on Rivals, Customers, and Suppliers","authors":"Gennaro Bernile, Evgeny Lyandres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2330871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2330871","url":null,"abstract":"We study how operating efficiencies in horizontal mergers affect market reactions of merging firms' rivals, customers, and suppliers. We measure operating efficiency gains using projections disclosed by merging firms' insiders. Higher efficiency gains are associated with lower announcement returns to merging firms' rivals (due to increased equilibrium output of merging firms), higher returns to their customers (due to lower equilibrium price of merging firms' output), and higher returns to their suppliers (due to the merged firm's higher equilibrium demand for inputs). Our results suggest that the pass-through of efficiency gains along merging firms' supply chains is as important as the effects of post-merger changes in market power.","PeriodicalId":319767,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance Empirical","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123019647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Method of Payment and Risk Mitigation in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"Peng Huang, Micah S. Officer, R. Powell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2401059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401059","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that the method of payment in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can mitigate country-level governance risk for the acquirer. We find a greater use of stock as the method of payment in cross-border deals involving targets from countries with high governance risk relative to that in the acquirer's country. This increased use of stock in riskier cross-border deals is consistent with the optimal reaction of the acquirer to avoid overpayment, even though we also show that the use of stock (instead of cash) as the method of payment in cross-border deals is associated with a lower likelihood of deal completion. Furthermore, for more recent periods (i.e., after 2000) we show that the use of stock (cash) has increased (decreased) significantly in cross-border deals, resulting in convergence with the method of payment used in domestic deals.","PeriodicalId":319767,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance Empirical","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124731588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}