DecisionSciRN: Supply Chain (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Supply Chain Performance with Target-Oriented Firms","authors":"L. Chen, Qinshen Tang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3533746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533746","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We study a supply chain in which a supplier sets the wholesale price and a retailer responds with an order quantity. Both of the two firms can be either risk-neutral—maximizing the expected profit—or target-oriented, which is to maximize her or his ability to reach a target profit. Academic/practical relevance: Our work not only sheds light on the benefit/loss of trading with target-oriented decision makers but also, adds new knowledge to the supply chain coordination literature. Methodology: We provide strong support for firms’ target-based preference and the linear target formation model through a survey as well as analyzing company data. With the firms’ target-oriented behavior evaluated by a CVaR-satisficing measure, we apply a game theoretical framework to investigate how the target-based preference affects supply chain performance. Results: A firm, be it a supplier or a retailer, is always hurt by its target-based preference but can benefit from its trading partner’s target-based preference. A risk-neutral supplier, for example, can sometimes reap the whole supply chain’s profit if the retailer is target-oriented, and a target-oriented supplier always performs better with a target-oriented retailer than a risk-neutral one. Furthermore, a target-oriented retailer and/or supplier can help alleviate the double-marginalization effect and with a specific target, can help the supply chain achieve the same efficiency level as in a risk-neutral centralized system, with just a wholesale price contract. Another important finding is that if both firms are target-oriented, then the supply chain can have a higher expected profit under a decentralized system than a centralized one. This contrasts with the case when both firms are risk-neutral. We also investigate the role of outside option and retailer-type misidentification and find that both can alleviate the retailer’s disadvantage of being target-oriented. Managerial implications: (i) The target-based preference can be exploited by the trading partner, and hence, a firm should adopt the target-oriented decision criterion with caution. (ii) A target-oriented retailer can explore strategies such as revealing his outside option or hiding his target-based preference in order to be less manipulated. (iii) Whether a firm (and the supply chain) can benefit from its trading partner’s target-based preference often depends on how ambitious the trading partner (and the firm itself if it is target-oriented) sets the target. (iv) Target-based preference of one or both firms can help the supply chain reach the first-best efficiency. (v) When both firms are target-oriented, decentralization can be preferred to centralization.","PeriodicalId":319095,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Supply Chain (Topic)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131659303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supply Chains Involving a Mean-Variance-Skewness-Kurtosis Newsvendor: Analysis and Coordination","authors":"Juzhi Zhang, S. Sethi, T. Choi, T. Cheng","doi":"10.1111/poms.13159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13159","url":null,"abstract":"The classical newsvendor problem seeks to minimize the expected inventory cost or maximize the expected profit. But optimizing an expected value alone does not fully capture the stochastic nature of the newsvendor problem. Inspired by the higher‐moment analyses explored in finance literature, we conduct a mean‐variance‐skewness‐kurtosis (MVSK) analysis for the newsvendor problem. We first derive the analytical expressions for the profit’s mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis in the standard newsvendor setting, and reveal their structural properties. We then establish various MVSK optimization problems and find the solution to each of them. We show that kurtosis aversion always induces the newsvendor to order less, while skewness seeking can induce the newsvendor to order either more or less depending on the specific structure of the profit’s skewness, which is affected by the symmetric and asymmetric properties of the demand distribution. Finally, based on the Pareto‐optimality concept, we address the challenge of supply chain coordination (SCC) in the presence of MVSK agents in two specific cases: (i) each agent maximizes its MVSK‐objective‐function and (ii) each agent maximizes its expected profit function, subject to given constraints on the profit’s variance, skewness, and kurtosis. In each case, we explore whether and how the supply chain can be coordinated. We find that considering the MVSK preferences of supply chain agents will affect the achievability of SCC and flexibility of the coordinating contract. We also uncover that if we assume an individual MVSK agent to be an MV one, the achievability of SCC by contracts will be very much negatively affected.","PeriodicalId":319095,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Supply Chain (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129092575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Coordination of Multi-Echelon Supply Chains Using the Guaranteed Service Framework","authors":"Tor Schoenmeyr, S. Graves","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3243806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3243806","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We use the guaranteed service (GS) framework to investigate how to coordinate a multiechelon supply chain when two self-interested parties control different parts of the supply chain. For purposes of supply chain planning, we assume that each stage in a supply chain operates with a local base-stock policy and can provide guaranteed service to its customers, as long as the customer demand falls within certain bounds. Academic/practical relevance: The GS framework for supply chain inventory optimization has been deployed successfully in multiple industrial contexts with centralized control. In this paper, we show how to apply this framework to achieve coordination in a decentralized setting in which two parties control different parts of the supply chain. Methodology: The primary methodology is the analysis of a multiechelon supply chain under the assumptions of the GS model. Results: We find that the GS framework is naturally well suited for this decentralized decision making, and we propose a specific contract structure that facilitates such relationships. This contract is incentive compatible and has several other desirable properties. Under assumptions of complete and incomplete information, a reasonable negotiation process should lead the parties to contract terms that coordinate the supply chain. The contract is simpler than contracts proposed for coordination in the stochastic service (SS) framework. We also highlight the role of markup on the holding costs and some of the difficulties that this might cause in coordinating a decentralized supply chain. Managerial implications: The value from the paper is to show that a simple contract coordinates the chain when both parties plan with a GS model and framework; hence, we provide more evidence for the utility of this model. Furthermore, the simple coordinating contract matches reasonably well with practice; we observe that the most common contract terms include a per-unit wholesale price (possibly with a minimum order quantity and/or quantity discounts), along with a service time from order placement until delivery or until ready to ship. We also observe that firms need to pay a higher price if they want better service. What may differ from practice is the contract provision of a demand bound; our contract specifies that the supplier will provide GS as long as the buyer’s order are within the agreed on demand bound. This provision is essential so that each party can apply the GS framework for planning their supply chain. Of course, contracts have many other provisions for handling exceptions. Nevertheless, our research provides some validation for the GS model and the contracting practices we observe in practice.","PeriodicalId":319095,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Supply Chain (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130796096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}