J. Hamrick, Farhang Rouhi, A. Mukherjee, Marie Vasek, T. Moore, Neil Gandal
{"title":"Analyzing Target-Based Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes","authors":"J. Hamrick, Farhang Rouhi, A. Mukherjee, Marie Vasek, T. Moore, Neil Gandal","doi":"10.1145/3464967.3488591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3464967.3488591","url":null,"abstract":"As the number of cryptocurrencies has exploded in recent years, so too has the fraud. One popular strategy is when actors promote coordinated purchases of coins in hopes of temporarily driving up prices. Prior work investigating such pump and dump schemes has focused on the immediate impact to prices following pump signals, which were largely interpreted as following the same strategy. The reality, as with most cybercrimes, is that the operators of the schemes try out a much more heterogeneous mix of tactics. From a population of 12,252 pump signals observed between July 2017 and January 2019, we identify and examine 3,683 so-called target-based pump signals that announce promoted coins alongside buy and sell targets, but without a coordinated purchase time. We develop a strategy to measure the success of target pumps over longer time horizons. We find that around half of these pumps reach at least one of their sell targets, and that reaching their peak price often takes days, as opposed to the seconds or minutes required in pumps studied previously. We also examine the various groups promoting coins and present evidence that groups try a variety of distinct strategies and experience varying success. We find that the most successful groups promote many coins and issue many pumps, but not for the same coins. As decentralized finance becomes more popular, a deeper understanding of price manipulation techniques like target pumps is needed to combat fraud.","PeriodicalId":317243,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123432318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adrian Dabrowski, Katharina Pfeffer, Markus Reichel, Alexandra Mai, E. Weippl, Michael Franz
{"title":"Better Keep Cash in Your Boots - Hardware Wallets are the New Single Point of Failure","authors":"Adrian Dabrowski, Katharina Pfeffer, Markus Reichel, Alexandra Mai, E. Weippl, Michael Franz","doi":"10.1145/3464967.3488588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3464967.3488588","url":null,"abstract":"Hardware wallets are currently considered the most secure way to manage cryptocurrency keys and sign transactions. However, previous publications show that such tokens can be replaced or manipulated in a number of hard-to-detect ways pre- or post-delivery to the user and that implemented (remote) attestation and authenticity checks fail their purpose for multiple reasons. We analyzed the architecture of current products by examining their initialization procedure and attestation methods. Unlike previous publications, we found that tightened attestation and communications encryption will not solve the fundamental architectural flaws sustainably. We conclude that the architecture of current-generation cryptocurrency hardware wallets missed the opportunity for a resilient design by copying the PC's wallet architecture and thus merely shifting the single point of trust from the PC to the hardware wallet. We advocate a mutually verified architecture through changes to BIP32/BIP44 wallet architectures to incorporate collaborative signatures and key generation. This way, neither a compromised wallet nor a compromised PC can meaningfully manipulate keys or transactions.","PeriodicalId":317243,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121022624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concentrated Liquidity in Automated Market Makers","authors":"Robin Fritsch","doi":"10.1145/3464967.3488590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3464967.3488590","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the introduction of concentrated liquidity has changed the liquidity provision market in automated market makers such as Uniswap. To this end, we compare average liquidity provider returns from trading fees before and after its introduction. Furthermore, we quantify the performance of a number of fundamental concentrated liquidity strategies using historical trade data. We estimate their possible returns and evaluate which perform best for certain trading pairs and market conditions.","PeriodicalId":317243,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117292729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Market Makers","authors":"Robin Fritsch, Roger Wattenhofer","doi":"10.1145/3464967.3488589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3464967.3488589","url":null,"abstract":"We suggest a framework to determine optimal trading fees for constant function market makers (CFMMs) in order to maximize liquidity provider returns. In a setting of multiple competing liquidity pools, we show that no race to the bottom occurs, but instead pure Nash equilibria of optimal fees exist. We theoretically prove the existence of these equilibria for pools using the constant product trade function used in popular CFMMs like Uniswap. We also numerically compute the equilibria for a number of examples and discuss the effects the equilibrium fees have on capital allocation among pools. Finally, we use our framework to compute optimal fees for real-world pools using past trade data.","PeriodicalId":317243,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130018906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}