{"title":"Inter-Firm Connections, Alliance Formation and the Value Created by Alliances","authors":"Yun Liu, T. Mantecón, S. Silveri, Wei Sun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3568815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3568815","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of inter-firm connections on alliances. We find that both professional connections and social connections, borne out of board interlocks, employment ties and educational ties, increase the likelihood of alliance formation. In addition, the market reacts more favorably to alliance announcements in the presence of such connections, and this positive valuation effect increases with the degree of information asymmetry between the partner firms. Our findings are consistent with inter-firm connections creating value because they facilitate the flow of information between partner firms, thereby reducing moral hazard concerns and the risk of ex-post opportunistic behavior.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115913378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Overconfident CEOs Ignore the Market?","authors":"Wei-Hsien Li","doi":"10.6529/RSFM.201712_29(4).0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.201712_29(4).0003","url":null,"abstract":"本文透過CEO是否完成已宣告之購併交易來研究CEO過度自信與向市場學習的關係。利用選擇權交易行為為基礎的CEO過度自信指標,本文發現即便控制了CEO與股東的利益衝突,相較其他CEO,過度自信的CEO會漠視市場對已宣告購併之負面反應而繼續完成購併。上述結果在考量不同敏感性測試以及內生性因素後仍然成立,也並非由於同一批CEO擁有較佳管理能力或者私人資訊。本研究結果支持下列假說:即便他們與股東利益一致,過度自信CEO做決策時會漠視市場有意義的回饋。","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132781491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Out-of-the-Money CEOs: Private Control Premium and Option Exercises","authors":"Vyacheslav Fos, Wei Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2355084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2355084","url":null,"abstract":"When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests, such as the record dates and nomination status, and are more pronounced when the private benefits are higher or when the voting rights are more crucial. The distortions suggest that incumbents value their stocks higher than the market price when voting rights are valuable for defending control.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114271216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bridging the Gulf between Executive Characteristics and Organizational Outcomes: The Intertwined Roles of Cognition, Aggregation Structure, and the Environment","authors":"Felipe A. Csaszar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2259253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2259253","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a theory about how firm performance depends on cognition, aggregation structure, and the environment. The theory is developed as a formal model, and it characterizes: cognition in terms of managers' experience and mental representations (whether they apprehend the environment from a specialist's versus a generalist's viewpoint); aggregation structure as decision rules (whether the firm's decisions are made by one manager or by several managers); and the environment as the projects --- of varying complexity and uncertainty --- considered by the firm. The results show that, in environments of low uncertainty or high complexity, an inexperienced generalist outperforms groups of experienced specialists at managing firms; yet when the environment is uncertain but not complex, groups of experienced specialists do better. The model is used to identify industry conditions under which it may be advantageous to use co-CEOs, inexperienced CEOs, or specialist CEOs. The paper also discusses whether management education should focus on training specialists or generalists and whether firms should follow simple or complex rules.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126538646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavioral Finance","authors":"D. Hirshleifer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2480892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2480892","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioral finance studies the application of psychology to finance, with a focus on individual-level cognitive biases. I describe here the sources of judgment and decision biases, how they affect trading and market prices, the role of arbitrage and flows of wealth between more rational and less rational investors, how firms exploit inefficient prices and incite misvaluation, and the effects of managerial judgment biases. There is need for more theory and testing of the effects of feelings on financial decisions and aggregate outcomes. Especially, the time has come to move beyond behavioral finance to \"social finance\", which studies the structure of social interactions, how financial ideas spread and evolve, and how social processes affect financial outcomes.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130012260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Group Polarization in Board Decisions About CEO Compensation","authors":"David H. Zhu","doi":"10.1287/orsc.2013.0848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0848","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how chief executive officer CEO compensation decisions may be influenced by a major group decision-making tendency referred to as group polarization among outside directors. I start by explaining why outside directors on average tend to support relatively high low CEO compensation when they previously witnessed relatively high low CEO compensation across different boards. Group polarization theory then suggests that when outside directors on average tend to support relatively high low CEO compensation prior to board discussions, they will support even higher lower focal CEO compensation after the discussions. In addition, this study proposes three important moderators of the group polarization effect. Specifically, 1 demographic homogeneity among outside directors and 2 the similarity of the minority's prior decision context are proposed to weaken the group polarization effect, whereas 3 outside directors' power relative to inside directors is predicted to strengthen it. Longitudinal analyses 1995-2006 of Fortune 500 CEOs' compensation provide support for these theoretical predictions. This study contributes to corporate governance research on CEO compensation by advancing a novel group decision-making approach to examining this important decision.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133105598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Differences in Perception of the Participants in the Management Process and Its Real Trajectory","authors":"Olaf Flak, Adrian Pyszka","doi":"10.7341/2013943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7341/2013943","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the paper is to present results of the research that was focused on managers’ behaviours. We tried to discover the main differences between the real trajectory and perception of managers in the field of two types of management processes. In the first part of the paper there is a theoretical foundation of process management and conclusions that led to a research model. In the second part we present the state of art in the field of human perception theories. Then, we describe assumptions of the research and methods of gathering data. What is important in the case of research method, an observation and a survey were used. The observation was done using the online management tools. During the research, managers were given a small project to lead. We recorded their actions and when their projects were completed, we asked them how they had acted. As a result of the research, there are three examples of description of managers’ behaviours and their perception. In the introduction we formulated two hypotheses and on the grounds of the research result we prove both statements in conclusion of the paper.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126510490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO Succession and Proprietary Directors: Evidence from Spanish Listed Firms","authors":"G. Stein, Manuel V. Gallego, M. Cuadrado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2324052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324052","url":null,"abstract":"La version espanola de este articulo se puede encontrar en: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324055This study advances research on CEO succession and board monitoring of senior executives by examining how proprietary directors can affect the probability of CEO dismissal. Drawing on our newly developed database covering all CEO successions occurring in all Spanish listed firms during the period 2007-2010, we propose that proprietary directors may increase the board’s monitoring efforts over the chief executive, forcing him to resign in situations of poor performance. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally, using CEO succession data taken from 111 publicly-traded firms in the Spanish ‘mercado continuo’ over a four-year period.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123045437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Birds of a Feather: Value Implications of Political Alignment between Top Management and Directors","authors":"Jongsub Lee, Kwang J. Lee, Nandu J. Nagarajan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023683","url":null,"abstract":"For 2,695 US corporations from 1996 to 2009, we find that alignment in political orientation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and independent directors is associated with lower firm valuations, lower operating profitability, and increased internal agency conflicts such as a reduced likelihood of dismissing poorly performing CEOs, a lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. Importantly, we show that our results are driven neither by the effects associated with various measures of similarity and diversity within the board nor the effects of local director labor market and political conditions on board structure. We provide evidence that our measure of individual political orientation reflects the person׳s political beliefs rather than opportunistic attempts to seek political favor. Overall, our results suggest that diversity in political beliefs among corporate board members is valuable.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130206220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accountability of Independent Directors - Evidence From Firms Subject to Securities Litigation","authors":"François Brochet, Suraj Srinivasan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2285776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285776","url":null,"abstract":"We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.","PeriodicalId":312164,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Strategy & Top Management Teams (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130808030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}