{"title":"Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: the Tale of University Licensing","authors":"R. Jensen, Marie C. Thursby","doi":"10.3386/W6698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W6698","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argue that unless universities have the right to license patentable inventions, many results from federally funded research would never be transferred to industry. Our survey of U.S. research universities supports this view. Results point to the embryonic state of most technologies licensed and the need for inventor cooperation in the commercialization process. Thus, for most university inventions, there is a moral hazard problem with regard to inventor effort. Our theoretical analysis shows that for such inventions, development would not occur unless the inventor's income is tied to the licensee's output by payments such as royalties or equity. Sponsored research can also be critical to commercialization, but it alone does not solve the inventor's moral hazard problem.","PeriodicalId":311876,"journal":{"name":"Scheller: Strategic Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129943857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Whither Flat Panel Displays?","authors":"K. Krishna, Marie C. Thursby","doi":"10.3386/W5415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W5415","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines possible consequences of subsidies to R&D and to volume production proposed under the Clinton administration's flat panel display initiative. We do this in the context of a model in which firms behave competitively in the short run, while realizing that their choices of capacity and yield-improving R&D in the medium and long run will affect market price. Policy simulations show that steady state yields and profits are lower, while prices are higher with subsidies for capacity acquisition than with R&D subsidies. This occurs because a firm's incentives to do R&D are diminished by a subsidy on capacity costs.","PeriodicalId":311876,"journal":{"name":"Scheller: Strategic Management (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131727575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}