Mostly Law最新文献

{"title":"Ralls and National Security Review of Foreign Investments","authors":"Ji Li","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2994533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2994533","url":null,"abstract":"With its enormous open market, the United States has long been a magnet for foreign direct investments (FDI). Historically, most of the FDI originated from U.S. allies such as the U.K. and Canada and posed minimal threat to U.S. national security. In the past decade, however, surging FDI from non-allies elevated the tensions between safeguarding U.S. national security and preserving a free and open investment market. In response, Congress reformed the review process by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to enhance the scrutiny of FDI and congressional oversight. The agency enjoys broad discretion and its review is shrouded in secrecy. Yet given the national security nature of the regime, no foreign investor had ever challenged the agency until 2013, when a Chinese-invested company filed a federal lawsuit against CFIUS alleging, among others, violations of its constitutional right to due process. Few thought the plaintiff had more than a minimal chance of winning, and the trial court indeed ruled in favor of the government. Yet to the surprise of most experts, the DC Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held the CFIUS’s action unconstitutional. \u0000 \u0000As the first and only lawsuit against CFIUS in the agency’s entire history, the case (Ralls v. CFIUS) has caught a great deal of attention and generated heated debates. But to date the debates have mostly centered on the legal merits of the case. Few have analyzed the key assumptions underlying the trial court ruling and the critiques of the appellate ruling, let alone the practical impacts of the case. This article narrows the gaps by empirically exploring the following three questions. One, is the assumption valid that foreign investors with complete information assume the risk of presidential veto by skipping the notification to CFIUS prior to their acquisition of U.S. assets? The trial judge and most CFIUS experts have adopted, consciously or not, that assumption, so has the agency itself. However, as will be demonstrated below, the assumption lacks empirical support. Two, has the DC Circuit ruling any significant practical effects on how foreign investors cope with the CFIUS regime, as some critiques have predicted? According to the empirical analysis, Ralls has at most a temporary effect on foreign investors’ perception of CFIUS review. Third, how do foreign investors view and respond to the regime in general? The article presents preliminary evidence that the investors’ actions reflect salient legal issues of the CFIUS law. The findings have important policy and theoretical implications.","PeriodicalId":310860,"journal":{"name":"Mostly Law","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128969618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conflicts of Interest in Finance and Auditing: Can They Be Successfully Regulated, and Does Disclosure Minimize Them?","authors":"Morten Kinander","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2809181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809181","url":null,"abstract":"Relying on research from social psychology and business ethics, this article argues that the current massive regulatory regime surrounding the attempts to curb what is perceived to be damaging conflicts of interests in the financial industry is based on misguided assumptions, and that the trend of increasing detailed rule-making, supervision and sanctioning in this area might be counter-effective.","PeriodicalId":310860,"journal":{"name":"Mostly Law","volume":"23 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114015363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Endogenous Legal Traditions","authors":"C. Guerriero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2444690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2444690","url":null,"abstract":"A key feature of a legal system is the set of institutions used to aggregate the citizens’ preferences over the harshness of punishment, i.e., the legal tradition. While under common law appellate judges’ biases offset one another at the cost of volatility of the law, under civil law the legislator chooses a certain legal rule that is biased only when he favors special interests, i.e., when preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous and/or the political process is sufficiently inefficient. Hence, common law can be selected only under this last scenario. This prediction is consistent with a novel dataset on the lawmaking and adjudication institutions in place at independence and in 2000 in 155 transplants, many of which reformed the transplanted legal tradition.","PeriodicalId":310860,"journal":{"name":"Mostly Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124875813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}